Title VII and the Complex Female Subject by Abrams, Kathryn
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 92 Issue 8 
1994 
Title VII and the Complex Female Subject 
Kathryn Abrams 
Cornell Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, Law and 
Gender Commons, and the Legislation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2479 (1994). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol92/iss8/6 
 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan 
Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
TITLE VII AND THE COMPLEX FEMALE 
SUBJECT 
Kathryn Abrams* 
There are so many roots to the tree of anger 
that sometimes the branches shatter 
before they bear. 
Sitting in Nedicks 
the women rally before they march 
discussing the problematic girls 
they hire to make them free. 
An almost white counterman passes 
a waiting brother to serve them first 
and the ladies neither notice nor reject 
the slighter pleasures of their slavery. 
But I who am bound by my mirror 
as well as my bed 
see causes in color 
as well as sex. 
and sit here wondering 
which me will survive 
all these liberations. 
- Audre Lorde1 
One strength of Title VIP has been its capacity to accommodate 
the changing conceptions of discrimination and the self-conceptions 
of subject groups. In the first decades of its enforcement, advocates 
have raised - and courts have endorsed - a range of contrasting 
conceptions in order to broaden the employment opportunities of 
protected groups. This flexibility is particularly evident with re-
spect to women. 
The most recurrent, and most influential, theory has been an 
"equality" or "sameness" theory of discrimination. This theory de-
scribes women as substantially similar to men in most respects ger-
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School; Associate Professor, Cornell Program on Ethics 
& Public Life. B.A. 1980, Harvard-Radcliffe; J.D. 1984, Yale. - Ed. I would like to thank 
Martha Chamallas and Michael Harper for their helpful and thought-provoking comments 
on an earlier draft of this essay. I would also like to thank Stewart Schwab for useful conver-
sations on the subject of this essay. 
1. AUDRE LoRDE, Who Said It Was Simple, in UNDERSONG: CHOSEN POEMS Ow AND 
NEW 95 (rev. ed. 1992). 
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as 
amended principally at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. III 1992)). 
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mane to employment; it describes discrimination as the prejudiced 
or erroneous failure to recognize this similarity, resulting in treat-
ment of women as inferior, unable, or otherwise different from the 
paradigmatic male denizens of the workplace. A second theory, 
which has surfaced in cases involving pregnancy or gender-role ex-
pectations, highlights ways in which women differ from men. It 
notes that women's participation in the workforce is shaped by bio-
logical differences related to gestation and childbirth and by 
gender-role expectations that affect behavior in the workplace and 
require the integration of conflicting responsibilities of work and 
family. According to this "difference" theory, discrimination re-
sults from the failure to recognize these differences, to anticipate 
the devaluative light in which employers may view them, or to ac-
commodate them in structuring the demands of workplaces. A 
third theory, which has been particularly influential in cases involv-
ing sexual harassment, characterizes discrimination as the devalua-
tive sexualization or derogation of women in the workplace. 
Whether employers are expressing overt hostility or manifesting 
"sex role spillover,"3 harassment characterizes women primarily as 
sexual objects, or as objects of sex-based derision, rather than as 
competent workers. Women themselves are shaped by the perva-
siveness of sexual objectification inside and outside the workplace; 
they are likely to perceive sexualized conduct as more of a threat to 
their professional and personal security than would their male 
counterparts, and they may feel less able to complain or take action 
against the harasser. 
Despite outward differences, however, the theories that have in-
formed Title VII enforcement also reflect important similarities. 
Each characterizes the identity on the basis of which women claim 
relief as comparatively simple and fixed. It may be biologically 
given, as with some difference theories; or emerge from social con-
struction, as with sexual objectification or other difference theories; 
or arise from some unspecified combination of forces, as with 
equality theory. But regardless of the source of this identity, what it 
means to be a woman is, in the context of each of these theories, a 
fairly straightforward proposition. The defining characteristics can 
be simply stated, generally through comparison to men; they apply 
with relative consistency to the group in question, and they do not 
shift in valence or emphasis over time or in response to differing 
'circumstances. The discrimination women suffer is similarly uni-
3. This term is taken from BARBARA A. GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE 15-16 (1985). 
See infra note 213. 
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tary, in that it rests on _a particular understanding or set of related 
understandings that operate consistently across the membership of 
the victim group. 
Title VII enforcement may face a greater challenge as it re-
sponds to a more recent series of accounts of gender discrimination 
- those that emphasize the complex, intersectional character of 
the female subject4 and the variability of the discriminatory animus 
that subject encounters. These accounts, as they have emerged in 
feminist theory and political practice, reflect not only a concern 
about the conceptual inadequacy or instability of categories but 
also a concern with the political stakes of unitary, or categorical, 
representations of women. Categorical representations have privi-
leged the perspectives of the most powerful women; they have 
fueled the mobilization of negative stereotypes and prevented the 
recognition of ambivalence that might ground alliances with other 
groups. 
Cases highlighting complex subjectivity have increasingly ap-
peared in court, as persons claiming intersectional forms of discrim-
ination, or manifesting identities that are ambivalent in relation to 
the existing statutory categories, have sought relief under Title VII. 
Many courts have been unwilling to accommodate these under-
standings within Title VII doctrine, requiring that claimants disag-
gregate and choose among the elements of their identities; others 
have awarded relief to complex claimants but failed to give an ac-
count of the discrimination they face that would help integrate such 
claims into the mainstream of Title VII doctrine. One factor con-
tributing to these failures is that courts have made little effort to 
make explicit either the assumptions that underlie complex sub-
jects' claims of discrimination or the barriers that Title VII doctrine 
currently presents to them.5 
4. For purposes of this essay, I understand subjectivity to have both an external element 
and an internal element. The external element reflects concerns such as what kind of subject 
a particular person or legal claimant appears to be, what kind of influences have shaped her, 
and what kinds of groups can lay claim to her loyalties or affiliations. The internal element 
concerns how she perceives or responds to particular circumstances or behaviors, as well as 
the features of the perceptual framework through which she views the world. In other words, 
the term subject may denote an actor or agent - the external element - or the locus of 
subjective perception - the internal element. 
5. These assumptions and the contrasting assumptions that create barriers under Title VII 
are discussed infra in Part Ill. One example of such an assumption is the complex claimant's 
position that the group-based characteristics targeted by discrimination may be biologically 
given, formed by social construction, or both. Title VII doctrine, in contrast, views group-
based characteristics subject to protection - for example, race or gender - as biologically 
given. 
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After exploring recent doctrinal efforts to respond to complex 
claimants, I address these questions and assess the prospects of 
change. Although the unitary or categorical notions of group iden-
tity under which Title VII has historically been enforced might run 
counter to this goal, two other features of Title VII jurisprudence 
will assist proponents of interpretive change: the demonstrated ca-
pacity of Title VII doctrine to accommodate diverse accounts of dis-
crimination, and the integration of assumptions that will be useful 
to complex claimants into existing bodies of Title VII doctrine, such 
as sexual harassment, disparate impact, and disparate treatment law 
relating to stereotypes. 
I. THE EMERGENCE OF A COMPLEX FEMALE SUBJECT 
A. Antecedents 
The claim that "second wave" feminists embraced a notion of a 
unitary, identitarian female subject should not be overstated.6 The 
singular conceptualizations of women's perception or experience 
that marked early feminist efforts were partly strategic; to highlight 
the voices that had been excluded, it was often useful to streamline 
the message and downplay complexity or contradiction.7 More-
over, even when unitary conceptions were not attributable solely to 
strategic ends, they often held the seeds of their dissolution. Ac-
counts that hypothesized the social construction of gender 8 at least 
implicitly raised the question of why women were not subject to 
other constructive influences as well. In addition, the juxtaposition 
of any two such theories - the difference and dominance theories, 
for example - revealed that even one's identity "as a woman" 
could be shaped by multiple images, norms, and influences. 
Nonetheless, it is difficult to deny the tendency in many earlier 
feminist theories toward singular characterizations of female sub-
jects. Equality theory's designation of women as "similar to men" 
involved little specification of women's subjectivity, yet it implicitly 
6. The term second wave usually refers to the revival of interest in women's rights and 
equality ignited in the 1960s and 1970s by the work of Betty Friedan, Gloria Steinem, 
Germaine Greer, Kate Millet, and others. Here I extend the term to cover academic move-
ments in feminism including equality, difference, and dominance theories. 
7. For example, feminists who sought to demonstrate that the victim's perspective had 
been excluded from rape adjudication emphasized the similarities rather than the differences 
among rape victims' perspectives on the act. See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE LJ.1087 
(1986). 
8. See, e.g., CATHARtNE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987) (presenting a domi-
nance theory emphasizing social construction through male sexual violence); SARA 
RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING (1989) (presenting a difference theory emphasizing social 
construction through the experience of ongoing care for a dependent other). 
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invoked the Enlightenment image of the presocial, rational, self-
directing subject - a subject whose essential unity and coherence 
were distinguishing and influential characteristics. Difference and 
dominance theories, whose subjects were constituted through social 
construction, offered comparably singular accounts: · the woman 
manifesting the "ethic of care"9 was constituted predominantly by 
her domestic commitments and the social expectations that re-
inforced them; the woman described by dominance theory was 
forged by the relentless and violent sexualization to which she was 
subjected.10 Moreover, some of these theorists struggled to present 
their theses as the singular and correct explanation of women's con-
dition, explicitly opposing the kind of juxtaposition that might high-
light the construction of a complex subjectivity.11 
Several concurrent developments helped to move feminist legal 
scholars and advocates toward expression of a more complex fe-
male subjectivity. One was a shift in the strategic considerations 
that had encouraged the tendency toward unitary depictions. Op-
ponents of change began to use singular characterizations of 
women's perceptions or experiences to stigmatize and stereotype 
women claiming injury. The difference-based imagery of domestic-
9. This term originated in CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE {1982). On my 
reading, I am prepared to accept her claim that she did not intend to link such an ethic in a 
rigid way to female (biological) sex or (social) gender. See id. at 2. However, many subse-
quent interpreters of Gilligan's work, both sympathetic and critical, have understood her to 
make a strong claim about the connection between women and the care ethic. See Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculation on a Women's Lawyering Process, 
1 BERKELEY WoMEN's L.J. 39 (1985) (providing a sympathetic account interpreting Gilligan 
as establishing a strong link); Joan Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797 
(1989) (providing a critical account interpreting Gilligan as establishing a strong link). 
10. Catharine MacKinnon's writings reflect this idea: 
[S]exuality [i]s a social construct of male power: defined by men, forced on women, and 
constitutive of the meaning of gender . 
. . . So many distinctive features of women's status as second class - the restriction 
and constraint and contortion, the servility and the display, the enforced passivity, the 
humiliation - are made into the content of sex for women. 
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 128-30 (1989). 
11. Catharine MacKinnon is the best example of this tendency. Her choice of the title 
Feminism Unmodified for her 1987 book, for example, denotes her belief that her theory 
constitutes feminism, period, and that efforts to theorize women's oppression differently con-
stitute modifications that detract from the effort by departing from that essential understand-
ing. Other indicia of this belief are evident at various points throughout her writing. See id. 
at 173 {describing her characterization of rape as "[t]he view that derives most directly from 
victims' experiences, rather than from their denial"). For an interesting discussion of the 
reasons MacKinnon rejects the possibility of a pluralism among feminists, see Christine A. 
Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes, 41 STAN. L. REv. 751, 754-
63 {1989) (reviewing Feminism Unmodified). 
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ity was used to ascribe segregated workforces to women's choice.12 
The mainstream media transformed the dominance-tinged account 
of "learned helplessness" into images of pathologically passive 
women,13 and unsympathetic courts used it to deny child custody to 
battered mothers.14 The earlier - and continuing - need to artic-
ulate readily intelligible images of women was supplemented by a 
contrasting need to show' heterogeneity, within the group and 
within individual women, to resist the damaging manipulation of 
unitary understandings.15 Yet this very interpretation of and re-
sponse to the problem by feminist activists was itself informed by 
contemporaneous developments in feminist theory. 
One was the movement within social theory from structuralist to 
poststructuralist accounts of social construction. Structuralist theo-
ries had challenged liberal phenomenological accounts of the sub-
ject by introducing descriptions of that subject - its actions and, 
indeed, its awareness - as being determined or produced by struc-
tures of language or economics.16 Poststructuralist theories re-
tained the structuralist challenge to the autonomy of individual 
subjectivity, while exposing the contingency or indeterminacy of 
structural influence. Rather than characterizing the subject as the 
product or artifact of one underlying structure, poststructuralists 
described the subject as a "locus" at which multiple structures inter-
sect in variable, local patterns.17 
12. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986), affd., 839 
F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). For a thoughtful discussion of this tendency, particularly in relation 
to the Sears case, see Williams, supra note 9. 
13. See Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Sepa-
ration, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 4 (1991). 
14. Id. at 49. 
15. Complex or nonunitary depictions are not, of course, a foolproof political strategy. 
They can be manipulated as well by opponents who claim that women "want it both ways" or 
that the difficulty of generalizing about women's experiences suggests that making changes to 
benefit women is either unnecessary or impossible. In the particular context discussed above, 
however, unitary images have created a political liability to which more complex images pres-
ent at least a partial solution. 
16. I use the term liberal phenomenological to refer to accounts that accept as an un-
reduced point of departure the subject's experience of its own intentionality and conscious-
ness. Cf. Thomas C. Heller, Structuralism and Critique, 36 STAN. L. REV. 127, 135 n.14 
(1984) (defining existential and transcendental phenomenology). Paradigmatic structuralist 
theorists who are understood to have deconstructed this account of the subject by introduc-
ing the notion of structural determination include Marx, Saussure, and Levi-Strauss. See 
KARL MARX, CAPITAL (Frederich Engels ed. & Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling trans., 
Foreign Language Publishing House 1961) (1867); FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN 
GENERAL LINGUISTICS (Charles Bally et al. eds. & Ray Harris trans., Gerald Duckworth Co. 
1983) (1916); CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, MYTH AND MEANING (1978); CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, 
THE RAw AND THE CooKED (John Weightman & Doreen Weightman trans., 1969). 
17. Representative poststructuralist theorists include JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAM· 
MATOLOGY (Gayatri c. Spivak trans., 1976); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUAL• 
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A second development, which was informed by and dovetailed 
with the critique of structuralism, was the antiessentialist critique 
within feminist theory. Although this critique is widely credited 
with illuminating the diversity of women as a group, it also had im-
portant implications for the depiction of the subjectivity of individ-
ual women. Because of its importance for the development of a 
complex account of subjectivity in feminist legal theory, I will ex-
amine this factor in greater detail.18 
B. Antiessentialist Critiques in Feminist Legal Theory 
Antiessentialist critiques penetrated the world of feminist prac-
tice long before they entered the realm of scholarship. Sojourner 
Truth's challenge to the use of domestic imagery to convey the ex-
perience of all women dates back to the nineteenth century.19 
ITY (Robert Hurley trans., 1980); JEAN·FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION 
(Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., 1984). Some poststructuralists also identify a 
school of left poststructuralism, which attempts to turn the multiplicity and indeterminacy of 
structural influence to progressive political purposes. See, e.g., ERNESTO LECLAU & 
CHANTAL MOUFFE, HEGEMONY & SOCIALIST STRATEGY: TOWARDS A RADICAL DEMO-
CRATIC POLITICS 186-87 (1985). ' 
18. I also emphasize what I will call the "antiessentialist" critique because it is more con-
cerned with the negative social consequences of unitary categorization, as well as with the 
indeterminacy or instability of categorization as such. I draw this distinction from the work 
of Kimberle Crenshaw, who identifies her own efforts as focusing primarily on the social 
consequences of categorization. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersection-
ality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241, 1298 
(1991) ("[F]or the most part, the dimension of racial domination that has been most vexing to 
African Americans has not been the social categorization as such, but the myriad ways in 
which those of us so defined have been systematically subordinated."). In highlighting the 
circumstances of the categorically ambivalent claimant, I may focus more on the incoherence 
of unitary categories than does Crenshaw. Yet even this focus is the product, not of an inter-
est in categorical incoherence as such, but of a concern with the unjustified marginality, even 
within ostensibly progressive legal reform efforts, of those who are categorically ambivalent. 
I should also note that in my use of the term antiessentialist to describe legal feminists of 
color who have challenged the exclusory and false universalism of some mainstream feminist 
legal theories, I depart from the usage of Crenshaw, who describes antiessentialists as analo-
gous to postmodernists and juxtaposes "intersectional" feminism to both. See id. at 1296. 
My use of the term antiessentialist as denoting one who is concerned not simply with the 
descriptive accuracy but with the political consequences of categorical representations is 
more consistent with that of Angela Harris, who targets from the standpoint of black femi-
nists what she describes as the "essentialism" of Catharine MacKinnon and Robin West, 
although she describes her own approach as "postessentialist" or embodying "multiple con-
sciousness." See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. 
L. REV. 581, 591-608 (1990). 
19. Sojourner Truth addressed the second annual convention of the women's rights 
movement. Sustaining the hostile shouts of white feminists, who thought it unfit that a black 
woman address the gathering, she spoke in response to a man who argued that women were 
too weak to perform their share of manual labor. Her words, now famous, demonstrated 
that the nineteenth-century social imagery of domesticity had never applied to black women: 
Dat man ober dar say dat women needs to be helped into carriages, and lifted ober 
ditches, and to have de best places ... and ain't I a woman? Look at me! Look at my 
arm! ... I have plowed, and planted, and gathered into barns, and no man could head 
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Women of color and lesbians who had not heard their experiences 
described in early consciousness-raising sessions raised dissenting 
voices within the "second wave" feminist movement.20 By the late 
1970s and early 1980s, arguments stressing the variety and erasure 
of many women's experiences had entered the field of feminist 
scholarship as well. Scholars described a range of ways in which 
mainstream feminist theorists had characterized the perspectives of 
a privileged subset of women - those who were white, straight, 
and middle class - as the vantage point of women as a group. The 
critique challenged the descriptive, epistemological, and ethical 
dimensions of feminist theory. The descriptions of "women's" ex-
perience or perception that had become commonplace within femi-
nist theory were exposed as perilously incomplete;21 the revealed 
solipsism of mainstream accounts also cast doubt on the sufficiency 
of experiential argumentation, of the revaluation of rationality, and 
of other epistemological and ethical innovations.22 The antiessen-
tialist critique, finally, exposed the exclusionary power dynamic that 
underlaid one kind of feminist unity; the unity that characterized 
accounts of women as a group had been achieved through the era-
sure or marginalization of the lives of less privileged women. 
Challenging unitary characterizations of women as a group did 
not, in and of itself, commit feminists to a multifocal account of 
female subjectivity. One could describe a nominal group women, 
composed of discrete subgroups shaped primarily by their own con-
stitutive influences and boasting their own largely unitary identities. 
Such a development was, in fact, the spectre used by scholars and 
activists to resist the critique. Some feminist scholars worried that 
me - and ain't I a woman? I could work as much as any man (when I could get it), and 
bear de lash as well - and ain't I a woman? 
BELL HOOKS, A1N'T I A WOMAN 159·60 (1981) (quoting Sojourner Truth). 
20. See, e.g., BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER (1984) (discuss· 
ing the marginalization or exclusion of black women in the contemporary feminist move· 
ment); Carole S. Vance, Pleasure and Danger: Towards a Politics of Sexuality, in PLEASURE 
AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY (Carole s. Vance ed., 1984) (noting that 
feminism may submerge or thwart exploration of women's sexuality, particularly by lesbians 
and other "sexual minorities"). 
21. Angela Harris notes, for example, that depictions of women as pedestalized "angels 
of the house" have never described the lives of black women; nor, moreover, do accounts of 
rape that emphasize assault by strangers or neglect the use of rape charges as a means of 
terrorizing and disciplining black men adequately reflect black women's experience. See 
Harris, supra note 18, at 595·96, 598-601. 
22. See, e.g., Elizabeth V. Spelman, The Virtue of Feeling and the Feeling of Virtue, in 
FEMINIST ETHICS 213 (Claudia Card ed., 1991) (noting the incompleteness of a feminist ethi-
cal theory that fails to attend to pain women have inflicted on each other); Katha Pollitt, 
Marooned on Gilligan's Island: Are Women Morally Superior to Men?, NATION, Dec. 28, 
1992, at 799 (providing a critique of the essentialism in the moral and epistemological theo-
ries of Carol Gilligan and Sara Ruddick). 
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the constructive force of gender would be lost in the proliferation of 
influences and categories;23 others claimed that emphasizing the di-
verse, nonintersecting aspects of women's subjectivity would im-
pede coalition and make efforts to seek concrete relief impossible.24 
Those who offered these arguments, however, failed to glimpse all 
the ramifications of the critique. A critique that began by empha-
sizing the diversity of women as a group ultimately highlighted the 
heterogeneity and complexity of individual female subjectivity as 
well. To illustrate this connection, I will tum briefly to the work of 
two antiessentialist theorists, Kimberle Crenshaw25 and Judy 
Scales-Trent. 26 
Both scholars bring to legal analysis elements of increasingly in-
fluential poststructuralist social theory. They combine, in different 
ways, poststructuralism's emphasis on the multiplicity and intersec-
tion of constructing "discourses" and its depiction of a multifocal, 
decentered self, whose articulation is variable and dependent on 
context. 
23. For interesting theoretical examinations of this claim, see Nancy Fraser & Linda J. 
Nicholson, Social Criticism Without Philosophy: An Encounter Between Feminism and 
Postmodernism, in FeM1N1sMIPoSTMoDERNISM 19 (Linda Nicholson ed., 1990); Kirstie 
McClure, On the Subject of Rights: Pluralism, Plurality and Political Identity, in DIMENSIONS 
OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY 108 (Chantal Mouffe ed., 1992). Laura Lee Downs and Joan Scott 
have recently engaged in a dialogue on this subject in the pages of Comparative Studies in 
Society and History. See Laura Lee Downs, If "Woman" ls Just an Empty Category, Then 
Why Am I Afraid to Walk Alone at Night? Identity Politics Meets the Postmodern Subject, 35 
COMP. STUD. Socv. & HIST. 414 (1993) (discussing JOAN W. Scorr, GENDER AND THE PoL1-
TICS OF HISTORY (1988)); Joan W. Scott, The Tip of the Volcano, 35 CoMP. STUD. SocY. & 
HIST. 438 (1993) (responding to Downs, supra); Laura Lee Downs, Reply to Joan Scott, 35 
CoMP. STUD. SocY. & HIST. 444 (1993). 
24. For useful critical assessments of this hypothesis, see ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INES-
SENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988); Harris, supra 
note 18, at 607, 612-15. 
25. The works on which I will draw in this discussion are: Kimberle Crenshaw, Whose 
Story ls It Anyway?: Feminist and Antiracist Appropriations of Anita Hill, in RACE-ING Jus-
TICE, ENGENDER-ING PoweR 402 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Whose 
Story ls It Anyway?]; Crenshaw, supra note 18; Kimberle Crenshaw, Beyond Racism and 
Misogyny: Black Feminism and 2 Live Crew, BOSTON Rev., Dec. 1991, at 6 [hereinafter 
Crenshaw, Beyond Racism and Misogyny]; Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalif:.ing the Inter-
section of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist 
Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 [hereinafter Crenshaw, 
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex]. 
26. Judy Scales-Trent has written several interesting articles on the intersectionality of 
race and gender. See, e.g., Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: Finding 
Our Place, Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 9 (1989); Judy Trent Ellis, 
Sexual Harassment and Race: A Legal Analysis of Discrimination, 8 J. Lems. 30 (1981) (rep-
resenting one of the very first articles dealing with complexity in the legal subject under Title 
VII). But for purposes of the following analysis, I focus on her article, Commonalities: On 
Being Black and White, Different and the Same, which pursues the distinct theme of categori-
cal ambivalence. Judy Scales-Trent, Commonalities: On Being Black and White, Different 
and the Same, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 305 (1990) [hereinafter Scales-Trent, Commonalities]. 
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Crenshaw argues that both feminism and antiracism have failed 
to account for the distinctive experiences of black women.27 Predi-
cated almost exclusively on the experiences or perceptions of white 
women and black men, these movements have shaped a legal doc-
trine in which black women do not exist - and a legal system in 
which they suffer notorious difficulty making their injuries intelligi-
ble to decisionmakers. As she describes the legal failure to compre-
hend the "intersectionality" of race and gender discrimination, 
Crenshaw also describes a black female subject who is constructed 
by multiple influences - racism, sexism, and the failure of feminist 
and antiracist discourses to account for her position. She illumi-
nates this process of construction in her discussion of rape.28 Like 
black men, black women are shaped by the coercive violence of 
white men; like white women, they often experience it through sex-
ual assault. But unlike either, black women must confront a legal 
system that for generations has refused their testimony as to mat-
ters of sex and still mediates it by reference to a library of particu-
larized stereotypes; they also must face liberatory movements that 
submerge the distinctive circumstances of black women by focusing 
on types of victimization characteristic of white women or race-
based sexual terrorism targeting black men.29 This system of inter-
secting yet marginalizing influences creates a subjectivity that is 
multifocal; against the backdrop of the available but always insuffi-
cient categories, it seems to be in constant movement. Elaborating 
on a black feminist response to the Senate "trial" of Anita Hill or to 
the obscenity prosecution of 2 Live Crew, Crenshaw describes a 
subjectivity that displays, in different moments, affinities with black 
men, affinities with white women, and solidarity with the marginal-
ization and the experience of other black women.30 
Scales-Trent offers a slightly different emphasis. She is con-
cerned not only with the failure of established legal categories to 
comprehend intersectional experience but also with the failure of 
any categories to capture the ambivalence and contradiction of 
27. This is one of the central theses in Crenshaw's exploration of "intersectionality." Her 
recent work explores it in a range of contexts. See Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It Anyway?, 
supra note 25 (rap music and hate speech); Crenshaw, Demargina/izing the Intersection of 
Race and Sex, supra note 25 (Title VII and antirape politics). 
28. See Crenshaw, Demargina/izing the Intersection of Race and Sex, supra note 25, at 
157-60. 
29. See id.; Crenshaw, Whose Story ls It Anyway?, supra note 25, at 411-16, 419-21. 
30. See Crenshaw, Beyond Racism and Misogyny, supra note 25, at 6, 30-33; Crenshaw, 
Whose Story ls It Anyway?, supra note 25, at 407-21. 
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those who apparently reside comfortably within them.31 Writing as 
a person who "[is] black and look[s] white in a society which does 
not handle anomalies very well,"32 she describes, through narrative 
prose poetry, the effects this socially created problem of fit has had 
on her own subjectivity. She must constantly bear the weight of 
choosing to be either black or white33 or confront the sense of dislo-
cation produced when that choice is made for her.34 Frequently she 
feels that she belongs nowhere.35 Distinctively revealing as Scales-
31. Scales-Trent, however, is not simply concerned with the incoherence of widely appli-
cable legal and social categories. As indicated by her focus on the emotional pain of living 
between categories and her choice of a narrative mode of exposition, she is concerned ;with 
what living one's life in this unmapped terrain means to and for the many who reside there. 
In a sense, Scales-Trent's argument partakes of both kinds of questions - questions about 
categorical incoherence and about its consequences in the lives of people - that Crenshaw 
identifies in Mapping the Margins. See Crenshaw, supra note 18, at 1297-99 (distinguishing 
these two types of questions). 
32. Scales-Trent, Commonalities, supra note 26, at 305. 
33. Scales-Trent writes: 
There is so much yet I have to tell you about. 
... about the guilt of a survivor, always protected by a white-skin disguise. 
Is it a disguise? 
How am I to take the good things that come my way? 
would that cabbie have stopped if he had known? 
would the doctor have been civil if ... ? 
would the clerk have been so helpful? 
would the real estate agent have rented me the apartment? 
How can I say "no, don't be nice to me; I'm black?" 
How can I try to keep from passing when all I'm trying to do is catch a fucking cab? 
Id. at 309-10. 
34. She offers a particularly poignant example: 
There she stood in her pink organdy dress, 
pink socks, 
pink ribbons, 
patent leather shoes. 
She was me when I was six 
getting ready for church on Sunday morning -
organdy dress so starched 
it scratched, 
head tender from the curling iron 
Mommie wielded so fiercely: 
pressed hair for Jesus, Lord! 
So I smiled at her, 
seeing myself. 
And she hid behind her mother's legs 
looked up at me 
and said 
"I'm skeered of white people." 
Id. at 315. 
35. Scales-Trent writes: 
I feel like a fraud. And I hate it. I hate myself for not being able to solve the dilemma. 
And I hate black people and white people for putting me out there. 
I heap ashes upon my head and beg for forgiveness 
Sackcloth and ashes. 
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Trent's experience may be, she does not present it as exceptional. 
On the contrary, she stresses the connections it has helped her forge 
with other groups that live both in and out of salient categories -
for example, Native Americans no longer on their tribal reserva-
tions36 - and with groups that repeatedly shape their identities 
through conscious, performative choices, including lesbians.37 
Scales-Trent's invitation to the reader to consider her experiences 
as having cross-categorical resonance suggests two larger points 
about the complexity of subjectivity - points that are also made by 
Crenshaw and other antiessentialist writers. 
The first point is that the multifocal quality of subjectivity, and 
one's movement between different elements of that subjectivity in 
expressing one's "identity," is not unique to marginalized groups.38 
The sense of being shaped by multiple, sometimes conflicting prac-
tices - exposure to classical music and to gospel - may take on a 
particular valence in Scales-Trent's case because it is the legacy of 
an interracial family, but it is not unique to her position as a "white 
black woman," or even as a black woman.39 These contrasting con-
If I am forgiven, 
perhaps I will be allowed back into the fold. 
Will someone forgive me? 
Id. at 310. 
36. See id. at 317-19. 
37. See id. at 321-22. 
38. This insight means that the unity, or unifocal character, of subjectivity that may ap· 
pear in particular moments does not reflect a natural unity or a necessary ordering of dispa-
rate elements but is, rather, temporary and contingent. Such unity may be achieved, as 
Angela Harris argues, by an act of will, an assertion of power that temporarily fixes one's 
identity. See Harris, supra note 18, at 610-15. It may be achieved, as Scales-Trent illustrates, 
in situations where one's lack of power means that unitary meanings can be conferred by 
others. See Scales-Trent, Commonalities, supra note 26, at 307 (explaining that she is per· 
ceived by "some as white, by some as black, by yet others as a black person but 'really white,' 
so (a) you can trust her and (b) you can't trust her"). It may be achieved through a moment 
of temporary affiliation - as when Scales-Trent overcomes her feelings of internal division 
by affiliation with the lives of her Indian or lesbian "sisters." See id. at 317-19, 321-22. It may 
be achieved through a moment of opposition - as when she suddenly notices that she may 
be the only black person in the Kennedy Center. See id. at 308. It may shift in a series of 
oppositions and affiliations - as when the divorcee whose struggle for legally conferred 
subsistence, as narrated in Shahbano, identifies alternately as a woman, as a Muslim, as a 
person with no income. See Zakia Pathak & Rajeswari Sunder Rajan, "Shahbano," in FEMI· 
NISI'S THEORIZE THE POLITICAL 257 (Judith Butler & Joan w. Scott eds., 1992). The contin-
gent character of these affiliations, like their multiplicity within the subjectivity of the persons 
in question, is not taken by antiessentialist theorists as something anomalous. 
39. Scales-Trent makes this point in different ways throughout Commonalities. For exam-
ple, she argues in one section that part of her feeling of not belonging anywhere and being 
incompletely understood everywhere was a product of leaving home - "a loss all of us 
know." Scales-Trent, Commonalities, supra note 26, at 318-19. In another section, she de-
scribes the notion of marginality as relative or contextual. She describes an evening in which 
she and other able-bodied friends were reluctant to leave a restaurant that was only partially 
accessible to a friend in a wheelchair. Jn this episode, she continues to describe herself as 
black, and black-and-white: "Dai was bitter, and angry at us. 'You wouldn't stay here if 
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structive influences are a feature of the lives of the privileged as 
well, as is the resulting sense of having a foot in many camps but 
not belonging completely or comfortably to any of them. In this 
sense, the term complex is a misnomer - at least in its implication 
that there are groups whose subjectivity is simple in comparison. 
Complexity of the type described by Scales-Trent is a predictable 
outcome of social construction, particularly in a culture marked by 
group-based heterogeneity and intersecting systems of oppression. 
A rich, multiply inflected form of subjectivity prevails across a 
range of social groups, if observers are prepared to see it.40 It is 
only under the influence of categorical frameworks, such as that of 
Title VII, or conceptions of a unified self, such as those that have 
prevailed from the Enlightenment to the early years of identity 
politics, that such a subject appears complex. 
Yet although a range of subjects may be possessed of this kind 
of complexity, the reluctance of many actors, in both life and law, to 
depart from more unitary conceptions of subjectivity does not have 
the same consequences for all of them. This is the second insight, 
and the one more often stressed by antiessentialist scholars. The 
striations and tensions, the juxtaposed elements that mark virtually 
anyone's subjectivity tend to be muted in the lives of more privi-
leged groups. The privilege associated with some characteristics -
for example, whiteness, maleness, heterosexuality - may permit 
many people, including those who bear these characteristics, to ig-
there were an entrance for blacks only.' I remember being tom by her analogy." Id. at 323. 
But she also describes herself as privileged: "[B]ecause I was not in the wheelchair, I was the 
one who was empowered." Id. So it appears that particularly because the notion of margin-
ality is itself relative and contingent, the kind of categorical ambivalence Scales-Trent de-
scribes exists among both the marginal and the privileged. But I also read in Scales-Trent the 
point I make below - that the categorical ambivalence of the privileged is better accommo-
dated by the social and legal order and may produce less difficulty in their lives. 
For another, less stark example of categorical ambivalence in the Jives of the privileged 
and the nonprivileged, see Joe Wood, What I Learned About Jews, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1994, 
§ 6 (Magazine), at 42 (describing two friends, one African American, the other Jewish, each 
of whom feels as if they contain a little of the other race, by virtue of cultural tastes and 
exposures). 
40. It is with this goal in mind that scholars such as Peggy Mcintosh, Elizabeth Spelman, 
and Martha Mahoney have attempted to highlight contexts that make evident to white 
women the fact that they have a race as well as a gender. See PEGGY McINTOSH, WHITE 
PRIVILEGE AND MALE PRIVILEGE: A PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF COMING To SEE CoRRESPON· 
DENCES THROUGH WoRK IN WoMEN's STUDIES (Wellesley College Center for Research on 
Women Working Paper No. 189, 1988); SPELMAN, supra note 24; Martha R. Mahoney, White-
ness and Women, In Practice and Theory: A Reply to Catharine MacKinnon, 5 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 217 (1993). Similarly, Maria Lugones has described the resistance of some white 
women to antiessentialist insights as arising from anxiety about the image of themselves that 
it projects: an image of fractured unity, of mixed status as victim and perpetrator of discrimi-
nation. See Maria C. Lugones, On the Logic of Feminist Pluralism, in FEMINIST ETHICS 35 
(Claudia Card ed., 1991). 
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nore them, thus reducing the range of influences that are perceived 
as constructing the subjectivity of group members.41 The power of 
certain groups may also permit them to normalize a particular ten-
sion or multiplicity in their members' subjectivities, making them 
less subject to the anxieties provoked by a perception of complex-
ity. Crenshaw notes, for example, that the intersectional identity of 
black women has often prompted courts to view them as problem-
atic antidiscrimination plaintiffs, whereas the intersectional identity 
of white men as affirmative action plaintiffs has posed few barriers 
to recovery.42 The social and legal reliance on unitary conceptions 
of subjectivity, therefore, does more than apply a simplifying lens to 
a range of subjects. It imposes a special burden on subjects who 
lack such indices of privilege - whose constructive or constitutive 
influences place them at cumulatively greater distance from the 
groups who prescribe the norm. 
II. THE COMPLEX SUBJECT IN TITLE VII LA w 
In a growing number of cases, courts have been obliged to con-
front subjects whose self-characterizations, and consequently whose 
claims, do not fit readily into the categories prescribed by Title VII. 
In this Part, I will explore two sorts of tensions between subject and 
·statute - tensions that roughly parallel the challenges of complex 
subjectivity explored by Crenshaw and Scales-Trent. In the first, 
the construction of the subject by multiple, intersecting influences 
leads her to manifest a complex identity or subjectivity that the cat-
egories of the statute do not reflect. The claimant in these cases 
faces a difficulty similar to that described by Crenshaw: she argues 
that she has suffered discrimination not only on the basis of "race" 
and of "sex" - both categories independently recognized by the 
statute - but on the basis of "race and sex," an intersectional form 
of discrimination about which the statute is largely silent. 
In the second set of cases, the difficulty is closer to that de-
scribed by Scales-Trent: the subjectivity of the claimant is not so 
much intersectional as ambivalent.43 The plaintiff claims discrimi-
41. See SPELMAN, supra note 24. Patricia Cain makes a similar point when she observes 
that when asked to identify three distinctive characteristics about themselves, white women 
note gender but not race, though they also have a race, and straight women note gender but 
not sexual orientation, though they also have a sexual orientation. See Patricia A. Cain, 
Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 208 (1989· 
1990). 
42. See Crenshaw, Demargina/izing the Intersection of Race and Sex, supra note 25, at 142 
n.12. 
43. Speaking of this ambivalence in the introduction to her essay, Scales-Thent notes: "In 
this essay, I struggle to combine two statuses which our society says cannot be combined: 
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nation on the basis of race or of gender in the standard, singular 
manner. Yet the claimant fits uneasily within the category estab-
lished for statutory protection because she manifests not only char-
acteristics associated with the category but also characteristics 
associated with the category statutorily presumed to be its opposite: 
this would be the case, for example, for a black person, like Scales-
Trent, who might be viewed as white, or for a man who expresses a 
"socially female" response to sexualized talk or conduct in the 
workplace. Moreover, in many of these cases, the perpetrator and 
the victim of discrimination fall technically within the same statu-
tory category, further complicating the courts' analysis. 
In examining these cases, I address two kinds of questions. 
First, I ask whether courts have been willing to accept the complex 
subjectivity of these plaintiffs and acknowledge that it renders plau-
sible their unfamiliar claims to relief, or whether courts have been 
intent on fixing these plaintiffs within a single category and viewing 
the discrimination they claim as outside the bounds of the statute. 
Second, when courts have been willing to acknowledge the injury of 
a plaintiff of this type, I ask whether they have offered an intelligi-
ble account of the kind of discrimination such claimants have suf-
fered. I conclude that while the answer to the first question is 
mixed - courts have sometimes been willing to award relief to 
such claimants, though more frequently they have not - the an-
swer to the second is almost uniformly negative. The courts offer 
no account of discrimination against a black woman, or of sexual 
harassment of a man who exhibits behavior that appears as socially 
female, that either explains these phenomena on their own terms or 
helps explain how they relate to the forms of race or gender dis-
crimination traditionally protected under the statute. 
A. Discrimination and lntersectionality 
The cases I will examine on intersectionality comprise two types 
of Title VII action. The first are primarily disparate treatment and 
occasionally disparate impact actions for termination, failure to 
hire, or failure to promote; the second are actions for hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment. 
black cannot be white and white cannot be black." Scales-Trent, Commonalities, supra note 
26, at 305. Scales-Trent's personal circumstances present an additional characteristic beyond 
those at issue in the cases discussed below: her ambivalence is not facially obvious to those 
who observe her, so she must make constant choices about whether or not to reveal it. This 
characteristic causes her to feel implicated in the oppression of, or exploitative of the privi-
lege of, one or the other of the groups to which she belongs. 
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1. Hiring, Firing, Promotion 
At first glance, the hiring, firing, and promotion cases involving 
the assertion of intersectional discrimination - usually on the basis 
of race and gender - seem to congregate around two poles.44 The 
negative pole is represented by the deservedly notorious DeGraf-
fenreid v. General Motors Assembly Division45 In this case the 
court was asked to determine whether the plaintiffs could maintain 
a disparate impact challenge to a "last-hired, first-fired" policy on 
the basis of their status as black women, or whether they would 
have to challenge the policy on the basis of either race or gender. 
The plaintiffs had alleged that because of past and ongoing discrimi-
nation on the basis of both race and gender, they were uniquely 
disadvantaged by the defendants' seniority-based policy.46 The 
court rejected any notion that "black women are a special class to 
be protected from discrimination,"47 concluding from the absence 
of legislative history or applicable precedent that "they should not 
be allowed to combine statutory remedies to create a new 'super-
remedy' which would give them relief beyond what the drafters of 
the relevant statutes intended."48 Then, relying in part on the out-
comes of contemporaneous Title VII litigation on the basis of race 
and of gender, the court concluded that General Motors was not 
liable for discrimination on the basis of gender and dismissed the 
case without prejudice so the plaintiffs could join an ongoing action 
challenging the seniority provisions on the basis of race.49 
The more promising pole is represented by a later case, Jefferies 
v. Harris County Community Action Assn.50 In Jefferies, a disparate 
44. This discussion is informed by a varied and thoughtful body of literature that seeks to 
examine employment discrimination law from a black feminist perspective. See Regina 
Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 539; Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection 
of Race and Sex, supra note 25; Ellis, supra note 26; Judith A. Winston, Mirror, Mirror on the 
Wall: Title Vil, Section 1981, and the Intersection of Race and Gender in the Civil Rights Act 
of 1990, 79 CAL. L. REv. 775 (1991); Cathy Scarborough, Note, Conceptualizing Black 
Women's Employment Experiences, 98 YALE LJ. 1457 (1989); see also Madeline Morris, 
Stereotypic Alchemy: Transformative Stereotypes and Antidiscrimination Law, 7 YALE L. & 
POLY. REV. 251 (1989); Jesse B. Semple, Note, Invisible Man: Black and Male Under Title 
Vil, 104 HARV. L. REV. 749 (1991). 
45. 413 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Mo. 1976). 
46. 413 F. Supp. at 143. 
47. 413 F. Supp. at 143. 
48. 413 F. Supp. at 143. 
49. 413 F. Supp. at 145. 
50. 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980). 
My discussion of DeGraffenreid and Jefferies reflects the way other commentators charac-
terize this body of law. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 44, at 252 (contrasting the Jefferies ap-
proach with the ostensibly outdated DeGraffenreid approach). Crenshaw emphasizes 
DeGraffenreid as highlighting patterns in Title VII adjudication of black women's claims -
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treatment challenge to the defendants' failure to promote and ulti-
mate termination of the plaintiff, the court acknowledged the possi-
bility of race and gender discrimination that is intersectional, in the 
sense that it "can exist even in the absence of discrimination against 
black men or white women."st The court considered this ground in 
addition to the plaintiff's challenges on the bases of race and of sex, 
despite the fact that the district court had failed to make any find-
ings based on the intersectional claim. The court held that a rem-
edy for "race and sex" discrimination was justified by the language 
of the statute and its legislative history. "The use of the word 'or' 
[in setting out statutory categories] evidences Congress' intent to 
prohibit employment discrimination based on any or all of the listed 
characteristics," the court declared;s2 moreover, the defeat by the 
House of Representatives of an amendment that would have added 
the word solely to modify the word sex also suggested that Congress 
did not intend to leave black women without a remedy against dis-
crimination directed particularly at them.s3 Perhaps most impor-
tantly, the court interpreted the "sex-plus" cases as establishing 
precedent for protection against intersectional discrimination.s4 In 
these cases, courts held that employers cannot enact rules that dis-
criminate against subclasses of women, distinguished not simply by 
gender but by an additional characteristic such as weight or marital 
or parental status.ss According to these courts, considering this 
type of discrimination to elude the "sex" category of the statute 
patterns that are further developed in cases involving, inter alia, class representation - but 
also contrasts it with Jefferies. See Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and 
Sex, supra note 25, at 143 n.13. Scarborough also emphasizes, as I do, the arbitrary limita-
tions on the "sex-plus" doctrine imposed by Judge v. Marsh, 649 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1986), 
although her argument concerns its disparate impact on black women rather than what it 
reveals about the courts' willingness to accommodate complex subjects. Compare Scarbor-
ough, supra note 44, at 1471-72 with infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text. 
51. 615 F.2d at 1032. 
52. 615 F.2d at 1032. 
53. 615 F.2d at 1032. 
54. 615 F.2d at 1034. Although Judge Randall authored the Jefferies opinion on behalf of 
the panel, she indicated in a footnote that she alone of the judges on the panel disagreed with 
the majority and maintained that the posture of the case did not permit the court to decide 
whether the plaintiff alleged intersectional discrimination; she also stated that the "sex-plus" 
cases, which had not involved the use of two statutory categories, did not establish precedent 
for providing a remedy in cases that did. 615 F.2d at 1034-35 n.7. 
55. See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (holding that a refusal 
to hire women with preschool-age children violates Title VII); In re Consolidated Pretrial 
Proceedings in Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that a policy requiring 
flight attendants with children to accept ground-duty positions violates Title VII), revd. on 
other grounds sub nom. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385 (1982); Sprogis v. United 
Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971) (holding that a no-marriage rule for stewardesses 
violates Title VII), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971). 
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would permit "the rankest sort of discrimination against women. "56 
It would be illogical, the Jefferies court concluded, if women were 
protected when the additional factor was a statutorily neutral char-
acteristic but not when the additional factor was also statutorily 
protected.57 Hence the court remanded the case for consideration 
in terms of "race and sex" discrimination, noting that for purposes 
of establishing the prima facie case and pretext, "black males and 
white females ought to be treated as persons outside Jefferies' 
class."58 
This apparently dichotomous judicial approach, however, is not 
the end of the story. On the one hand, after Jefferies, most courts 
have been reluctant to follow DeGraffenreid in dismissing intersec-
tional claims out of hand. On the other, Jefferies itself has not 
proved a durable precedent in securing judicial recognition of inter-
sectional claims. It has been followed in a number of cases, includ-
ing the much-discussed Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 59 in which 
the court acknowledged the possibility of a disparate impact action 
based on discrimination against either black women or single black 
women60 before concluding that defendant's "role model" policy 
was based on business necessity. Jefferies has also been restrictively 
construed, however, in ways that shed light on some courts' ambiva-
lence about intersectional discrimination claims. 
In Judge v. Marsh, 6l the court concluded that employment deci-
sions directed against black women may violate Title VII but 
sounded an alarm about the potential scope of Jefferies: 
The difficulty with this position is that it turns employment discrimi-
nation into a many-headed Hydra, impossible to contain within Title 
56. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 416 F.2d 1257, 1260 (5th Cir. 1969). 
57. 615 F.2d at 1034. 
58. 615 F.2d at 1034-35. 
59. 629 F. Supp. 925 (D. Neb. 1986). This case involved a recently adopted Girls Club 
rule that required the termination of any staff member who became pregnant outside of 
marriage. The Club justified this rule on the grounds that unmarried, pregnant staff members 
were poor role models for young girls in the context of an institution that programmatically 
sought to persuade them that pregnancies sharply curtailed opportunities for unmarried teen· 
age girls. 629 F. Supp. at 929. For a thought-provoking discussion of the relationship be· 
tween this case and the formulation of a black feminist legal theory, see Austin, supra note 
44. 
60. This court's opinion is somewhat ambiguous on this point. It states that the plaintiff 
alleged that "black single women" constituted the class affected, but in the next sentence it 
describes this allegation as reflecting "a combination of racial and sex-based discrimination," 
omitting any reference to singleness. 629 F. Supp. at 944. The court's subsequent reference 
to Jefferies either supports the inference that it is viewing the case as a "race and sex" case or 
suggests that it views Jefferies as supporting sex-plus cases involving three characteristics. 629 
F. Supp. at 944. 
61. 649 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1986). 
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VII's prohibition. Following the Jeff[e]ries rationale to its extreme, 
protected subgroups would exist for every possible combination of 
race, color, sex, national origin and religion. It is questionable 
whether any employer could make ari employment decision under 
such a regime without incurring a volley of discrimination charges. 
For this reason, the Jeff[e]ries analysis is appropriately limited to em-
ployment decisions based on one protected, immutable trait or funda-
mental right, which are directed against individuals sharing a second 
protected, immutable characteristic. The benefits of Title VII thus 
will not be splintered beyond use and recognition; nor will they be 
constricted and unable to reach discrimination based on the existing 
unlawful criteria.62 
This ostensibly Solomonic decision is problematic in several re-
spects. Although it appears to follow Jefferies, it departs from that 
case's statutory construction, which reflects a judgment that dis-
crimination based on any or all of the statutory categories is prohib-
ited by Title VII. More importantly, the court's decision to slay the 
"many-headed Hydra" and to prevent the emergence of "sub-
groups for every possible combination" reflects a profound discom-
fort with the recognition of a complex or multiply constructed sub-
ject. By invoking the potential proliferation of categories and 
imposing the apparently arbitrary restriction on "plus" factors, the 
Judge decision suggests that Jefferies is an anomaly that must be 
contained before it reconstitutes antidiscrimination doctrine. The 
last thing the Judge court claimed to see in Jefferies was an invita-
tion to reconsider the way that discrimination operates on or across 
groups, or th~ way that groups come to be constructed by discrimi-
natory practices. 
Some responsibility for this retreat, however, must fall on the 
Jefferies court, for that opinion offers scant elaboration of the inno-
vation it effects. Although it states that discrimination against par-
ticular subgroups of women should be viewed as statutorily 
pernicious63 and that black women may suffer discrimination when 
black men and white women suffer none,64 Jefferies provides little 
substantive description of the discrimination it seeks to prevent. It 
never answers several questions that are crucial to explaining the 
nature of intersectional discrimination. First, should the discrimina-
tion against black women be regarded as distinct because it is quan-
titatively greater - as they suffer a combination of what black men 
and white women receive - or because it is qualitatively different? 
62. 649 F. Supp. at 780 (citation omitted). 
63. 615 F.2d at 1034. 
64. 615 F.2d at 1032, 1034. 
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Second, if this difference is qualitative, is the discrimination suf-
fered by black women utterly distinct, or can it be related, even in 
its particularity, to the discrimination suffered by other groups of 
women? The Judge court's description of a "many-headed Hy-
dra"6S suggests that the claims of each subgroup are highly particu-
larized and lack common threads with the race or gender 
discrimination suffered by other subgroups; the Jefferies opinion of-
fers little ground for assessing this suggestion. Finally, how should 
one describe the relationship between this intersectional form of 
discrimination and those previously addressed under the statute? 
Are those forms of discrimination that target a subgroup less im-
portant - as Judge's imposition of arbitrary limits suggests - than 
those that target the group as a whole? Are those forms of discrim-
ination frequently regarded as general really as universal as they 
seem, or do they simply target a subgroup - white women -
which is not often recognized as a subgroup?66 None of these ques-
tions received attention from the Jefferies court. Jefferies may have 
opened the door to the protection of a particular intersectional cat-
egory, but because it fails to describe the conception of intersec-
tional discrimination that animates this protection or how that 
conception relates to more traditional understandings of discrimi-
nation under Title VII, the protection it offers is neither transform-
ative nor, ultimately, even stable. 
2. Sexual Harassment Cases 
The sexual harassment cases reflect different kinds of postures 
from claimants and different - though equally ambivalent - re-
sponses from courts. Although many sexual harassment cases in-
volve black women plaintiffs, plaintiffs comparatively rarely plead 
their cases as "race and sex" cases, even when the allegations ap-
pear to support an intersectional interpretation. When plaintiffs 
have interjected intersectional elements, those issues frequently 
emerge with respect to evidentiary issues or on appeal. An exam-
ple of the first pattern is Brooms v. Regal Tube Co. 67 Brooms in-
65. 649 F. Supp. at 780. 
66. We may be unaccustomed to thinking about whiteness as race, particularly in the 
context of antidiscrimination analysis, because it confers a race privilege rather than a race 
disadvantage. See supra notes 40-41. If one comes to be located within a subgroup of the 
group women by virtue of having a race, however, then white women are a subgroup as well. 
Moreover, the treatment conferred on white women can be understood as intersectionnl in 
that it responds to·_ and helps to create - gender disadvantage and race privilege. 
67. 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989), overruled in part by Saxton v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 
10 F.3d 526 (1993). Another example of a sexual harassment case with largely undiscussed 
racial overtones is Jew v. University of Iowa, 749 F. Supp. 946 (S.D. Iowa 1990). Jenn Jew, a 
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volved a pattern of repeated harassment by a supervisor beginning 
with (rejected) propositions, continuing with the plaintiff's com-
pelled exposure to "racist pornograph[y]"68 accompanied by racial 
slurs,69 and culminating in physical injury to the plaintiff when the 
supervisor threatened her life and she fell down a _flight of stairs 
attempting to escape. Brooms sued under section 198170 for racial 
harassment and under Title VII for sexual harassment and retalia-
tory discrimination. After losing a jury verdict on the section 1981 
claim, she prevailed on her Title VII claim for sexual harassment. 
Several factors contributed to the submersion of the intersectional 
character of the harassment in this case. The first was the plaintiff's 
pleading of the case: the complaint bifurcated the race and gender 
claims by statute as well as by claim, and there was no "race and 
gender" claim. The intersectionality of the plaintiff's claim was also 
submerged by the court, which noted the "racist" nature of the por-
nography and the attendant derogation but offered nothing about 
the implications of these facts for the nature of the plaintiff's claim. 
Although there were plausible reasons for these choices - the 
plaintiff may have viewed the sexual harassment claim as so strong 
on its facts that there was little to be gained by complicating it with 
a comparatively unfamiliar legal theory, and the court may have 
been reluctant to exceed the bounds of plaintiff's legal claims -
they ultimately had costs for the plaintiff. Brooms lost her racial 
harassment claim, and with it her opportunity for punitive dam-
ages.71 Although it is difficult to look behind a jury verdict, it is 
possible that the failure of the plaintiff to stress the racial inflection 
of the sexual harassment and the failure of preexisting doctrine -
Chinese-American professor of anatomy, was subjected to an intense campaign of sexist slurs 
by colleagues and denigrating graffiti in faculty buildings because of her professional associa-
tion with an unpopular department chair. These slurs included such terms as chink and Chi-
nese pussy. See Martha Chamallas, Jean Jew's Case: Resisting Sexual Harassment in the 
Academy, 6 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 71, 74 (1994) (citing 749 F. Supp. at 949 and Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 10, Jew v. 
University of Iowa, 749 F. Supp. 946 (S.D. Iowa 1990) {No. 86-169-D-2)). Although Jew 
ultimately prevailed in her sexual harassment claim, neither her framing of the case nor the 
court's decision called attention to the racial strain in the harassment. For a thoughtful anal-
ysis of Jew's long struggle for legal vindication and its implications for current cultural under-
standings regarding sexual harassment, see Chamallas, supra. 
68. 881 F.2d at 417. As described by the court, some of this material depicted interracial 
sex in a manner that may have suggested the subordination of the black woman, and some of 
the material associated black women with bestiality. See 881 F.2d at 417. 
69. Gustafson, the supervisor, allegedly stated that a picture showing a woman engaged 
in an act of sodomy showed the "talent" of a black woman. 881 F.2d at 417. 
70. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § l, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 
{1988)). 
71. See 881 F.2d at 417. 
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as replicated by this court - to legitimate the intersectional cate-
gory limited the extent to which the evidence in this case could be 
used to support a finding of racial harassment. 
In other cases, however, black women plaintiffs have placed 
more emphasis on the intersectional character of their claims. In 
Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 72 the plaintiff initially sued for racial 
harassment under section 1981 and for racial and sexual harassment 
under Title VII. The harassment at issue included a variety of racial 
epithets, some targeted at the plaintiff and at least one particularly 
evocative of discrimination against black women,73 as well as sexual 
comments toward and sexual touching of the plaintiff by her super-
visor. The plaintiff lost on all claims at the trial court level. When 
she appealed, alleging, inter alia, an erroneous failure by the district 
court to consider hostile environment sexual harassment, she 
sought to combine the evidence of racial hostility - itself found 
insufficient to support a racial harassment claim - with the evi-
dence of sexual harassment "to prove a pervasive pattern of dis-
criminatory harassment. "74 The court of appeals acceded to her 
demand, citing Jefferies's construction of Title VII, as well as its 
"sex-plus" rationale for allowing a "race and sex" claim.1s It stated 
that black female plaintiffs in such cases should be able to "aggre-
gate evidence of racial hostility with evidence of sexual hostility."76 
Hicks, however, like Jefferies, has been uncertain in its prece-
dential effects. Two recent cases, Stingley v. Arizona77 and Clay v. 
BPS Guard Services,78 illustrate the range of judicial response. In 
Stingley, the court not only followed Hicks in permitting aggrega-
tion of racial and sexual evidence79 but insisted that the standpoint 
from which to evaluate allegations be particularized to include both 
race and gender in cases in which the plaintiff is a black woman.so 
In Clay, on the other hand, the court resisted the intersectionality 
of the plaintiff's claim. Clay sought relief under Title VII for sexual 
and racial harassment culminating in constructive discharge. She 
had been exposed to physical assault on account of race, as well as 
72. 833 F.2d 1406 {10th Cir. 1987). 
73. The plaintiff alleged that one of her co-workers had referred to her as "Buffalo Butt." 
833 F.2d at 1409. 
74. See 833 F.2d at 1415. 
75. 833 F.2d at 1416. 
76. 833 F.2d at 1416. 
77. 796 F. Supp. 424 (D. Ariz. 1992). 
78. No. 92 C 2127, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8399 (N.D. Ill. June 18, 1993). 
79. See 796 F. Supp. at 428. 
80. See 196 F. Supp. at 428-29. 
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to a steady stream of verbal abuse, including repeated designation 
as the "nigger bitch," derogatory references to her sexual prefer-
ence, and descriptions of people of her race as '·'those who liked to 
live off welfare because they are lazy."81 The defendant moved to 
strike those portions of the plaintiff's complaint that related to sex-
ual harassment on the ground that her EEOC complaint, and the 
ensuing investigation, had raised allegations relating only to race.82 
The court granted the motion, stating that claims of discrimination 
outside the original EEOC charge were cognizable only to the ex-
tent that they are " 'like or reasonably related to the allegations of 
the charge and growing out of such allegations.' "83 It declined to 
credit the possibility that epithets like nigger bitch or references to 
lazy people on welfare implied derogation on the basis of sex as 
well as of race. 
The sexual harassment doctrine, like that relating to hiring, fir-
ing, and promotion, reflects some steps toward the recognition of 
complex claimants. The acknowledgment in Hicks and Stingley that 
black women may be differently situated than white women with 
respect to proving a sexual harassment claim reflects a recognition 
that even as women - that is, those who are claiming sexual har-
assment - claimants are constructed by race as well as gender. 
But the incomplete and flawed elaboration of that understanding 
by the courts has created difficulties. The emphasis on aggregation 
of evidence has raised an inference - operating as a limit, even 
though it is never explicitly defended - that discrimination against 
black women should be viewed primarily as an additive phenome-
non. Moreover, in failing to discuss particular epithets and the 
kinds of discriminatory understandings they convey, courts have 
forgone an important opportunity to show an intersectional dy-
namic at work. Terms like nigger bitch or Buffalo Butt are unlikely 
ever to be used against either black men or white women; they con-
vey a kind of racialized sexual hostility, or sexualized racial hostil-
ity, that cannot be disaggregated into its component parts. The 
failure to discuss the nature of the discriminatory animus at work in 
such examples has meant that triers of fact cannot see the racial 
element in what has been styled as sex discrimination - as in 
Brooms - or the sexual element in what has been styled as race 
discrimination - as in Clay. This failure has shaped unnecessary 
81. 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8399, at *3. 
82. 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8399, at *6. 
83. 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8399, at *9 (quoting Perera v. Flexonics, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 406, 
412-13 (N.D. Ill. 1989)). 
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losses for black women plaintiffs, as well as a reluctance on the part 
of many claimants to plead "race and sex" harassment.84 
Thus, although some courts have felt compelled to acknowledge 
the intersectional position of black women by allowing a "race and 
sex" claim under Title VII, they have not consolidated that protec-
tion by providing an account of the discrimination that this group 
faces. They may invoke, though not explain, an aggregative under-
standing of "race and gender" discrimination. Even this partial de-
scription comes at a price: it requires plaintiffs to separate evidence 
into "race" and "gender" categories and select a primary ~ocus in 
presenting their case. Moreover, the failure to explain how inter-
sectional discrimination in these cases relates to more conventional 
understandings of discrimination can make the claims of black 
women seem narrow or partial, while the claims of white women -
who also occupy an intersectional position - appear inclusive or 
universal.85 Finally, the courts' view of intersectionality in these 
cases as an anomaly, rather than as a way of reconceiving the sub-
jectivity of any claimant, leads them to cabin rather than to investi-
gate its influence. 
B. Discrimination and Categorical Ambivalence 
The claimants featured in the second set of cases manifest a dif-
ferent kind of complex subjectivity: it is produced, not by the inter-
section of two categorical traits, but by the juxtaposition of qualities 
thought to occupy polar positions within the same categorical di-
chotomy. Plaintiffs may be blacks with light skin, men who behave 
in "socially female" ways, women who respond to sexual harass-
ment in a manner more typical of men. 86 The ways in which courts 
84. It is interesting to note that academic arguments about confluence predate most or all 
of these cases. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 26. In the face of judicial refusal to elaborate the 
intersectionality in particular instances of abuse, however, it is not altogether surprising that 
plaintiffs and their attorneys have proved reluctant to press such claims. 
85. See Crenshaw, Demargina/izing the Intersection of Race and Sex, supra note 2?• at 
143-46 {discussing Moore v. Hughes Helicopter, Inc., 708 F.2d 475 {9th Cir. 1983), as an 
example of one consequence of this contrast: white women can represent a class composed 
of all women employees of a particular employer, but black women cannot). 
86. It is possible to argue that lesbians and gay men are categorically ambivalent with 
respect to the category gender. It is certainly true, as Sylvia Law and Marc Fajer have argued, 
that the choice of a sexual partner of the same sex, as well as certain consciously assumed 
behavioral characteristics of some lesbians and gay men, place them outside the complex of 
social norms and expectations associated with biological maleness or femaleness. See Marc 
A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes and 
Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 617-33 (1992); Sylvia 
A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 187, 218-21. 
I am ultimately reluctant, however, to describe lesbians and gay men as categorically am-
bivalent with respect to gender, because I am concerned that such a definition would assimi-
August 1994] Title VII and the Complex Female Subject 2503 
respond to such claimants are not dissimilar from those described 
above. Courts do not consistently deny relief to such claimants, so 
plaintiffs have been victorious even in cases in which the perpetra-
tors of their discrimination come from the same statutory catego-
ries. Yet courts often fail to acknowledge such complex claimants 
as the victims of discrimination, and the persuasiveness and stability 
of even positive outcomes has been undermined by a failure to 
elaborate the discrimination that such cases refiect.87 
late sexuality to gender, or instantiate an understanding of gender as connoting 
heterosexuality. Katherine Franke, for example, observes that a small but revealing body of 
opinions in which the law has been called upon to resolve cases involving ambivalence as to 
sex have pointed to (i) biological endowments and (ii) the sex of the object of the claimant's 
desire as the indices most important in establishing the claimant's sex for legal purposes. See 
Katherine Franke, Cherchez La Femme: Law, Sexual Identity and Desire 43 (1994) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author) (discussing cases in which the law was required to 
establish the sex of the claimant, including matrimonial cases involving transsexuals, viola-
tions of sumptuary laws, and so on). This has had the effect of rendering lesbians not quite 
fully female and gay men not quite fully male in the eyes of the law. Id. Particularly in light 
of this danger, I would prefer to follow the lead of a sizeable and interesting literature, begin-
ning with the literature of the "sex wars" of the early 1980s and continuing with the emerging 
field of Queer Theory, that emphasizes the complexity of the relationship between gender 
and sexuality. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATIER (1993); JUDITH BUTLER, 
GENDER TROUBLE (1990); EVE K. SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET (1990); see 
also Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in 
PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY, supra note 20, at 267. Sexuality, 
in general, and its relation to gender, in particular, seem to me too complex to permit the 
assimilation of homosexual sexual orientation to categories such as socially male or socially 
female. 
87. In the cases I discuss below, the categorical ambivalence with respect to race is fre-
quently a function of biology- that is, the claimant has a mixed race background and conse-
quently manifests lighter skin - whereas the categorical ambivalence with respect to gender 
is a function of the interplay between biological sex and social characteristics - that is, the 
ch1imant manifests social characteristics that do not correspond to his or her biological sex. 
My emphasis on cases that display this configuration should not be taken to suggest, how-
ever, that categorical ambivalence with respect to race need be biological or categorical am-
bivalence with respect to gender need be a product of the interaction of biological and social 
traits. In fact, it is not difficult to identify cases in which precisely the opposite patterns 
prevail. One of the great contributions of Kimberle Crenshaw's essay on the Clarence 
Thomas-Anita Hill hearings is to point out that both Clarence Thomas and Anita Hill were 
categorically ambivalent with respect to race over the course of the hearings. See Crenshaw, 
Whose Story Is It Anyway?, supra note 25. This ambivalence arose from the interaction of 
their biological race with the - often changing - social constructions that were applied to 
them and their actions during the course of the hearings. Anita Hill, biologically a black 
woman, was deraced - that is, rendered white in the minds of senators and the national 
television audience - by the fact that her actions with respect to Thomas were explained by 
reference to narratives patterned on the experience of white women and by Thomas's appro-
priation of the mantle of race with his "high tech lynching" speech. Id. at 407-16. Thomas, 
biologically a black male, was constructed as black by his selection to fill the vacancy left by 
Thurgood Marshall, reconstructed as nonblack by his insistently color-blind characterization 
of his life and commitments guring the first stage of the hearings, and reconstructed as black 
by his use of the metaphor of the "high tech lynching" to defend himself against the charges 
of Anita Hill. Id. at 407-21. I thank Anna Marie Smith for helping me to see this point. 
Conversely, there are a number of gender cases involving transsexuals in which categorical 
ambivalence with respect to gender is a function of ambivalence in biology. See, e.g., B. v. B., 
355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (involving an annulment sought on grounds that the hus-
band, a postoperative transsexual who had been born a woman, had fraudulently concealed 
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1. Hiring, Firing, Promotion 
The mid-1980s saw the rise of race discrimination claims filed by 
plaintiffs who were technically within the same racial category as 
the defendants they accused. In the context of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 
these cases were most often claims between whites of different eth-
nic groups; the two most prominent cases dealt with a Jew suing 
non-Jewish whitesss and an Arab suing non-Arab whites89 -
although one later case involved an action between two Puerto 
Ricans.90 In the later-emerging context of Title VII, blacks filed 
suits against other blacks. A look at two leading cases of this type, 
Walker v. Internal Revenue Service91 and Hansborough v. City of 
Elkhart Parks and Recreation Department, 92 reveals the analytic 
knots in which courts have tied themselves, seeking to respond to 
the complexity they present. 
Walker was a suit by a light-skinned black woman, alleging dis-
crimination perpetrated by a dark-skinned black woman. After a 
"strained" relationship in which the plaintiff was frequently singled 
out for criticism regarding insubstantial or imagined faults, she was 
fired by her supervisor for tardiness, incompetence, and attitude 
problems.93 She alleged that her termination was attributable to 
her supervisor's bias against light-skinned black people.94 The 
court rejected a magistrate's recommendation that the defendant be 
granted summary judgment because a Title VII action was not 
available to a light-skinned black person claiming discrimination by 
a dark-skinned black person.9s 
The court accepted the plaintiff's characterization of the case as 
discrimination on the basis of "color," rather than race. It relied 
first on statutory interpretation to conclude that it was appropriate 
to treat race and color as distinct,96 and then on a series of section 
1981 cases that appeared to support the court's recourse to color by 
his "true sex"); City of Columbus v. Zanders, Nos. 74AP-88, 74AP-90, 74AP-92, 74AP-93 
(Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 22, 1974) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file) (upholding the convictions 
of a preoperative transsexual for two violations of sumptuary laws). For an interesting dis-
cussion of these and other cases of biological gender ambivalence, see Franke, supra note 86. 
88. See Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987). 
89. See Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987). 
90. See Franceschi v. Hyatt Corp., 782 F. Supp. 712 (D.P.R. 1992). 
91. 713 F. Supp. 403 (N.D. Ga. 1989). 
92. 802 F. Supp. 199 (N.D. Ind. 1992). 
93. 713 F. Supp. at 404. 
94. 713 F. Supp. at 404-05. 
95. 713 F. Supp. at 408. 
96. 713 F. Supp. at 405-06. 
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permitting actions between people who were technically of the 
same race but differed in "ancestry or ethnic characteristics."97 In 
particular, the court rested on a Supreme Court case, adjudicated 
under section 1981, that had permitted race discrimination claims 
among different subgroups of whites because plaintiffs and defend-
ants were distinguished by their divergent ethnic backgrounds.98 In 
Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraj~ the Court held that the mean-
ing of race in the statute should not be limited by contemporary 
understandings highlighting three major racial groups; instead, it 
should be read by reference to its nineteenth-century context, in 
which race encompasses ethnic divisions, or denotes, in broader 
terms, the "stock" from which one is descended.99 The embodi-
ment of this understanding in section 1981's legislative history100 
made it clear that nineteenth-century legislators would have under-
stood Arab Americans and Anglo-Saxon Americans as belonging 
to different racial groups, notwithstanding the fact that both might 
be described as Caucasian. Citing to Al-Khazraji, the Walker court 
observed that "[i]t would take an ethnocentric and naive world view 
to suggest that we can divide caucasians into many sub-groups but 
some how all blacks are part of the same sub-group."101 It then 
concluded that the fact that the plaintiff and the defendant were 
both black did not, as a matter of law, prevent the plaintiff from 
suing under Title VII: whether the plaintiff's allegations are justi-
fied, despite the fact that the defendant belongs to the same race, is 
·a question of fact that must be determined by the fact finder.102 
In Hansborough v. City of Elkhart Parks & Recreation Depart-
ment, to3 which concerned a claim of discriminatory termination,104 
97. 713 F. Supp. at 406 (citing Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 
(1987)). 
98. Although the court used Al-Khazraji to support its recourse to color in the sense that 
this cases concerned the statutory viability of claims between members of the same race, Al-
Khazraji did not place intraracial cases within a separate category but rather took a broader 
view of the term race. Thus, strictly speaking, the categorical logic of Al-Khazraji is more 
supportive of the court's approach in Hansborough than in Walker. See infra notes 104-18 
and ~ccompanying text. 
99. 481 U.S. at 610-13. 
100. As the Court noted, the statute's legislative history indicates "that Congress in-
tended to protect identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimina-
tion solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics." 481 U.S. at 613. 
101. 713 F. Supp. at 407-08. 
102. 713 -F. Supp. at 408. 
103. 802 F. Supp. 199 (N.D. Ind. 1992). 
104. There is no indication in the opinion that Hansborough was of a different skin tone 
than his supervisor. Thus, one might legitimately wonder why I have classified Hansborough 
as a case of categorical ambivalence for purposes of this discussion. In so doing, I am seeking 
to interpret Hansborough's allegation that his supervisor discriminated against him on the 
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the court framed the question, not in terms of color, but in terms of 
race.105 The court ruled out reliance on legislative history, stating 
that this "specie of discrimination was not even a minor considera-
tion in the eyes of the sponsors of the legislation."106 The court 
then followed Walker in relying on the section 1981 cases, but it 
interpreted Al-Khazraji and Shaare Tefila, not as supporting the use 
of the category color, but as placing intraracial discrimination 
within the category race. 101 It endorsed the Al-Khazraji Court's 
discussion of the arbitrariness inherent in racial classification108 and 
concluded, with Walker, that if intraracial discrimination is possible 
among whites, it must also be possible among blacks.109 Relying 
apparently on the atypicality of the claimed discrimination, how-
ever - among the interactions of people of the same race, or 
among the concerns of Title VII's framers - the court held that a 
basis of race. Thus, assuming that race was actually an issue, it was because the supervisor 
perceived some difference between the race she manifested - the supervisor was a woman 
- and the race Hansborough manifested. Because the case provides no indication that 
either Hansborough or his supervisor had a mixed-race heritage, this perception of difference 
would seem likely to stem from social-role expectations regarding blackness. In treating the 
case as an analog to Walker - as concerning a categorically ambivalent claimant - I am 
assuming that the supervisor viewed Hansborough as biologically black and socially white, or 
not black, while viewing herself as both biologically and socially black, and discriminated 
against him on that basis. Because Hansborough alleged both race and sex discrimination -
an aspect of the claim that was, interestingly, not explored because of the ostensibly prelimi-
nary need to address the intraracial aspect of the claim - it also appears that the supervisor 
discriminated against Hansborough because of his failure to conform to social-role expecta-
tions for his biological category black male. Either of these explanations would make the 
case analogous to Walker in presenting a categorically ambivalent black claimant, but even 
more analogous to the sexual harassment cases, see infra section 11.B.2, in that the claimant's 
ambivalence is a function of the interaction of biology and social role expectation. 
If the supervisor, however, as a black woman, sanctioned Hansborough for his failure to 
conform to social role expectations connected with black men, this would not, technically 
speaking, be a case of discrimination among persons who occupied the same category. 
It is also possible that the supervisor discriminated against Hansborough because she 
viewed herself as biologically black but not socially black - or socially black female - and 
Hansborough as biologically and socially black (male). If this were the case, Hansboro11gh 
would still be interesting as a case about categorical ambivalence, as it considers antiblack 
race discrimination perpetrated by a person who was biologically black yet did not think of 
herself as black, but it would not, technically speaking, be a case about a categorically ambiv-
alent claimant. 
105. It is not clear from the opinion, but it is possible that a claim based on color was not 
available to Hansborough because he was not of a different skin tone than his supervisor. 
106. 802 F. Supp. at 203. 
107. See 802 F. Supp. at 203-06. 
108. See 802 F. Supp. at 205 (" 'There is a common popular understanding that there are 
three major human races .... Many modem biologists and anthropologists, however, criti-
cize racial classifications as arbitrary and of littie use in understanding the variability of 
human beings.'" (quoting Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. at 610 n.4)). The foregoing quote suggests 
the ultimate indeterminacy and varying social construction of categories such as race; this 
view, however, is neither the norm in Title VII cases, see infra section III.A, nor fully em-
braced in Walker or Hansborough, which decline to explore intragroup constructions of race. 
109. See 802 F. Supp. at 206. 
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plaintiff who alleges intraracial discrimination bears a "relatively 
unique and difficult burden of proof."11° Hansborough, who of-
fered no such evidence regarding the employer in general or his 
supervisor in particular, failed to carry this burden. 
These cases resolve the categorical questions presented without 
confronting the kind of discrimination involved. This is particularly 
true in Walker, which uses the category color to step around the 
question. Reliance on color is not irrational in a case where the 
distinction between the two black parties is one of skin tone, or 
color. The court's insistence, however, on treating color as a cate-
gory distinct from, and unshaped by the incidents of, race111 is more 
problematic. It suggests that the court may be less interested in 
clarifying its understanding than in evading the paradoxical racial 
relationship between the parties. Differences in color may be rele-
vant to blacks in an aesthetic· sense that has little to do with interra-
cial discrimination. "[W]e black people have always had a delicious 
way of describing ourselves,"112 notes Shirlee Taylor Haslip in a re-
cent memoir. "We call ourselves honey, caramel, ivory, peaches-
and-cream, mahogany, coal blue, red, bronze, amber .... "113 Yet 
when differences in color become a source of antagonism between 
blacks, the reasons cannot be so easily separated from race. In this 
society, whites have made Caucasian race - and, by inference, fair 
skin - a source of privilege. That blacks may internalize these 
meanings and apply them against other blacks seems paradoxical 
but is sometimes true: this pattern was, in fact, the subject of expert 
testimony when Walker returned for fact-finding.114 Yet it is an is-
sue that the court avoids raising or delineating when it acknowl-
110. 802 F. Supp. at 207. 
111. The court is not completely consistent about this: at times it seems not so much 
insistent on separating race and color as it is unclear about the relation between them. It 
quotes Felix v. Marquez, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCR) CJ[ 31, 279 (D.D.C. 1980), to the effect 
that " 'color is usually mixed with or subordinated to claims of race discrimination, but con-
sidering the mixture of races and ancestral national origins in Puerto Rico, color may be the 
most practical claim to present.'" 713 F. Supp. at 406 (quoting Felix, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. at 
31,279) (emphasis added by the Walker court). The Walker court notes that "[d)iscrimination 
against an individual because such individual comes from a racially mixed heritage possibly is 
of particular relevance to the instant case." 713 F. Supp. at 406-07. But the Felix case is 
treated as exceptional, discussed largely because the defendant - erroneously, in the court's 
view - raised it in support of his case. Most of the court's analysis is built on the analogy 
between differences in color and among ethnicities in the § 1981 cases. 
112. SHIRLEE T. HASLIP, THE SWEETER THE JUICE 30 (1994). 
113. Id. 
114. 1\vo expert witnesses reporting on intraracial perceptions of skin tone within the 
black community noted that "some darker-skinned blac,ks may have a feeling of inferiority in 
dealing with lighter-skinned blacks which may sometimes result in hostile or prejudicial treat-
ment of the latter by the former." Walker v. IRS, 742 F. Supp. 670, 675 (N.D. Ga. 1990) 
(Walker II), affd. without op., 953 F.2d 650 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 156 (1992). 
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edges the availability of an intraracial claim. The court's attempt to 
steer clear of these turbulent waters115 by resurrecting and isolating 
the quiescent statutory category of color seems peculiar and 
strained. 
Although Hansborough resolves to decide the question on the 
basis of race, it too reaches an odd explanatory impasse through its 
reliance on Al-Khazraji. The problem, of course, is not the analogy 
between section 1981 and Title VII but the implied analogy be-
tween the racial subgroups in question. The court's assurance that 
"'[i]t would take an ethnocentric and naive world view to suggest 
that we can divide caucasians into many sub-groups but some how 
all blacks are part of the same sub-group' "116 belies the fact that it 
is unwilling to perform for blacks the detailed intragroup analysis it 
provides for whites. Both decisions suggest that the problem high-
lighted by the section 1981 cases is one of shifting antagonisms be-
tween ethnic subpopulations of the same racial group. The Walker 
court completes the analogy, citing the "sharp and distinctive con-
trasts amongst native black African peoples (sub-Saharan) both in 
color and in physical characteristics."117 But Walker is not a case 
between blacks who trace their lineages to different African subcul-
Notwithstanding this evidence, the court in Walker II held that the plaintiff failed to prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that her termination was the result of invidious discrimi-
nation, and the defendant offered legitimate, nonpretextual reasons for the termination. 742 
F. Supp. at 676. The court concluded that there were non-color-based interpersonal conflicts 
between the plaintiff and her supervisor and that there was evidence suggesting that the 
plaintiff was "insubordinate, immature, impatient, disrespectful and unmanageable." 742 F. 
Supp. at 676. One difficulty in the plaintiff's case seemed to revolve around the fact that any 
comments made by her supervisor that seemed to denote intraracial prejudice - for exam-
ple, "[Y]ou need some sun" - were made behind closed doors without other witnesses. 742 
F. Supp. at 675 & n.4. 
Another possible explanation for intragroup discrimination is the so-called gatekeeper 
function. Members of protected groups understand at some level that their institution is 
unlikely to tolerate more than token representation of their group; as a result, they may 
police the entry of more members of that group into the institution in order to protect their 
own position. See Letter from Martha Chamallas, Professor of Law, University of Iowa, to 
Kathryn Abrams, Professor of Law, Cornell University (July 15, 1994) (on file with author) 
(describing explanations by African-American students of intragroup discrimination). Cath-
arine MacKinnon has cited this pattern as a reason that some women oppose feminism, par-
ticularly feminist efforts to regulate pornography. See MACKINNON, On Collaboration, ill 
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 8, at 198, 205. 
115. The court's very rendition of the facts of the case seems to point in the direction of 
this issue: "Ms. Walker has not presented any direct evidence that Ms. Lewis was prejudiced 
against light-colored skinned blacks. There is evidence that Ms. Lewis might have harbored 
resentful feelings toward white people, and therefore by inference, possibly toward light-
skinned black people." 713 F. Supp. at 404-05. Yet, having related these facts, the court 
never returned in any substantive way to discuss the discriminatory pattern they suggest. 
116. 802 F. Supp. at 206 (quoting 713 F. Supp. at 407-08). 
117. 713 F. Supp. at 408. 
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tures;118 Hansborough describes no apparent differences between 
the plaintiff and the alleged perpetrators. The subgroup differ-
ences, categorical ambivalences, and displaced antagonisms that 
might fuel discrimination among blacks are never framed or 
discussed. 
It is possible to interpret Al-Khazraji and Shaare Tefila in an-
other way: not simply as highlighting ethnic antagonisms, but as 
highlighting ethnic antagonisms that are structured within, and take 
some of their meaning from, the dynamics of race. Jews and Arabs 
might represent groups whose members appear to be Caucasian but 
are not socially understood as white. If these cases reflect Scales-
Trent's insight that the great racial divide does not exhaust the 
American social appetite for hierarchy and subordination - that 
there are blacks within whites, and whites within blacks, social con-
structs that have little to do with biological difference - Al-
Khazraji and Shaare Tefila might be used to give substance to the 
intragroup discrimination acknowledged in Walker and Hans-
borough. Yet it is not obvious that the Court intended them to be 
read in this way;119 more importantly, the Title VII cases do not 
even try to do so.120 They prefer to permit the same-race claims, 
while leaving unelaborated the notions of intragroup discrimination 
that might give them content. 
118. A brief suggestion that it involves a dispute between southern and northern blacks is 
never pursued. See Walker II, 742 F. Supp. at 675. 
119. The strongest suggestion that these cases might be interpreted in this way comes 
from Shaare Tefila. In that case, the Court reversed a court of appeals decision stating that 
Jews may not avail themselves of the protection of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988) on the ground 
that "'discrimination against Jews is not racial discrimination.'" 481 U.S. at 617 (quoting 
Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 785 F.2d 523, 527 (4th Cir. 1986)). The Court's conclu-
sion that discrimination against Jews may be racial discrimination, despite the fact that Jews 
are technically Caucasians, might mean that if a plaintiff is outside a biologically based cate-
gory but is the recipient of the same kind of animus that is directed against those in the 
category - that is, if the plaintiff is assimilated, by social construction, to those within the 
category - a claim of discrimination will lie. The Court also held, however, that the defend-
ant's animus itself is not sufficient to create a claim under § 1982 and that the plaintiff must 
belong to a group that the statute was intended to protect, a condition that Jews, under Al-
Khazraji's broad interpretation of race, satisfy. 481 U.S. at 617. Because of the second re-
quirement, the case may be more plausibly interpreted as meaning that the Court believed it 
had to find both membership in an ethnic group of the type covered by the statute and 
animus against that group - "race" in the broad sense - in order to extend protection 
under § 1982. 
120. Similarly, one might wonder about Hansborough's holding that the plaintiff in an 
intraracial case must bear a "unique and difficult burden of proof." 802 F. Supp. at 207. If it 
is simply a reflection of social probabilities - that whites are more likely than blacks to act 
on the basis of bias against blacks - it seems reasonable enough. Yet to the extent that it 
may be understood as an effort to exceptionalize racialized thinking within racial group 
boundaries, it may be less innocuous. 
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2. Sexual Harassment 
The sexual harassment cases present a similar difficulty in the 
context of gender: the possibility that one can both be and not be a 
member of a protected group - the possibility that one can suffer 
group-based discrimination perpetrated by a member of the group 
in question. In the sexual harassment cases, the social constructed-
ness - and ultimate instability - of the statutory categories is 
even clearer: what causes the plaintiff to fit uneasily within the es-
tablished category is not a physical characteristic, such as skin color, 
but the plaintiff's own behavior. In the most striking of these cases, 
the plaintiffs are men who fit awkwardly within their ostensible 
gender category because of their discomfort with sexualized talk 
and conduct in the workplace.121 
121. In a second set of cases, the plaintiffs are women who fit uneasily within their cate-
gory because of their response to the experience of being harassed. These cases are not 
precisely analogous to the rest of those described in this section because they are not in-
stances of same-group harassment: the targets in these cases are women, and the perpetra-
tors are men. They do, however, reflect · themes that are common to the male sexual 
harassment cases: first, the plaintiff manifests behaviors or qualities not associated with her 
biological sex, creating an ambivalent or uneasy fit with the category in which she would be 
placed by reference to her biology; second, this ambivalence makes it more difficult for her to 
recover on her claim. In some of these cases, women manifest nonconforming behaviors 
prior to the harassment; these behaviors appear to have been a factor that made them partic-
ular targets for harassment - that is, harassment designed to discipline their transgression of 
gender-role expectations. See infra text accompanying note 146 (discussing disciplinary har• 
assment); see, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986) (considering the 
claims of a woman described as loud and abrasive who was a particular target of harassment 
by a co-worker). In Rabidue, the court not only failed to explore the possibility that Vivienne 
Rabidue's unfeminine behavior may have made her a target for disciplinary harassment, but 
also offered her abrasiveness toward the alleged offender as a ground for suggesting that the 
behavior at issue was more an expression of mutual personal animosity between equals than 
a one-sided exploitation of a sex- or rank-based power inequality. 805 F.2d at 615. 
In other cases, women are not harassed because of particular behaviors; instead, the non-
conforming behaviors emerge when women are harassed. Unlike the debilitated or - often 
justifiably - paralyzed behavior predicted of women who suffer sexual harassment, these 
claimants persist in their tasks and object loudly to the perpetrators before ultimately filing 
legal actions. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 60 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 'll 42,070 
(M.D. Tenn. 1990) (considering the claims of a plaintiff who delivered an ultimatum to the 
head of the company regarding his harassment and quit when his behavior failed to improve), 
affd. per curiam, 60 Emp. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 'll 42,071 (6th Cir. 1992), revd., 114 S. Ct. 367 
(1993); Ukarish v. Magnesium Elektron, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1315 (D.N.J. Mar. 1, 
1983) (considering the claim of a plaintiff who returned the sexual epithets and conversation 
of her harassers and kicked one in the scrotum after a severe incident of harassment). The 
district court treated the plaintiff in Ukarish with considerable severity: not only did she lose 
her sexual harassment claim, on the grounds that her willingnes~ to engage in the use of 
sexualized language with her alleged harassers indicated that their conduct was not unwel-
come and her continuation on the job indicated that the harassment had not been pervasive 
enough to affect her psychological well-being, see 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1322, but she 
also lost a disparate treatment claim relating to her termination for fighting, though she al-
leged that several male employees had gotten into fights without being terminated, see 31 
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1322-23. Similarly, in the district court decision in Harris, the plain-
tiff's willingness to remain on the job and to speak to her harasser led the courts to conclude 
that the defendant's behavior must not have been sufficiently pervasive to generate a hostile 
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The earliest cases alleging harassment of a man by a man in-
volved homosexual advances by a supervisor toward an em-
ployee.122 Although these cases lacked the characteristic nexus of 
the plaintiff's sexual victimization within the workplace and the 
plaintiff's group's sexual and· material subordination without, 123 
courts still found such harassment to violate Title VIl.124 But-
tressed by the pronouncements of the EEOC,125 the courts held 
that such victims could prevail if they could demonstrate that they 
would not have been harassed "'but for [their] sex.' "126 This for-
mulation had the advantage of producing an appealing gender-
neutral symmetry, without requiring the courts to speak at length 
about the relationship between homosexuality and harassment.127 
environment; the opinion also noted the fact that the plaintiff smoked, drank beer, and so-
cialized with her colleagues as indicating that she was not disturbed by the environment at 
work. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 60 Emp. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 'lI 42,070 (M.D. Tenn. 1990). 
One judicial vehicle for expressing skepticism about the plaintiff's claim has been the "seri-
ous psychological damage" requirement recently invalidated by the Supreme Court in Harris. 
See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370-71 (1993). Until the Supreme Court's 
opinion, this requirement may have served as an instrument for marginalizing women who 
reflected what courts viewed as gender ambivalence in.their response to sexual harassment. 
After Harris, courts may have the same intuition, but they no longer have the use of this 
particular instrument; it will be interesting to see whether this skepticism and marginalization 
appears in different guise. 
Another case that involved a categorically ambivalent female claimant is Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1988). In this case, a Title VII action for failure to 
promote, the female candidate for partner appeared to have been the target of discrimination 
because she combined biological femaleness with a lack of conventional femininity in dress 
and comportment. Yet in Hopkins, the plaintiff's categorical ambivalence seemed to make it 
more rather than less clear to the Court - as well as to the district court and the court of 
appeals - that she had received treatment that would not have been administered to a man, 
including the mediation of her behavior through sexist stereotypes in the evaluation process. 
See 490 U.S. at 255-58. 
122. See, e.g., Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537 (M.D. Ala. 1983); Wright 
v. Methodist Youth Servs., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
123. This nexus was initially described by Catharine MacKinnon as distinguishing and 
defining sexual harassment. See CATHARINE A. MAcK!NNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF 
WORKING WOMEN 1-7 (1979). 
124. See, e.g., 597 F. Supp. at 541; 511 F. Supp. at 310. 
125. According to § 615.2(b) of the EEOC Compliance manual, "[a] man as well as a 
woman may be the victim of sexual harassment." EEOC Comp!. Man. (CCR) 'lI 3101 (July 
1987). In addition, the section notes that "[t]he victim and the harasser may be of the same 
sex where, for instance, the sexual harassment is based on the victim's sex ... and the har-
asser does not treat employees of the opposite sex the same way." Id. 
126. Wright, 511 F. Supp. at 310 (quoting Barnes v. Castle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. 
Cir. 1977)). 
127. The larger picture with respect to homosexuality and sexual harassment is not so 
symmetrical. The courts seem quite willing to stop the advances of a homosexual supervisor 
- though it is difficult to identify these cases as gender discrimination in any sense beyond 
the literal "but for" definition of the courts. One explanation may be found in the misunder-
standing in some early sexual harassment opinions that harassment - that is, a form of 
gender discrimination - is largely a matter of unrequited sexual desire. Another explana-
tion may lie in the discomfort many straight males experience at the thought of being the 
object of male pursuit. For a discussion of how this discomfort has shaped the controversy 
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Although the plaintiffs in these early cases did not necessarily 
exhibit categorical ambivalence, the cases shaped the approach of 
the courts to a second set of male-male cases: those in which the 
alleged harassment is not connected with the sexual desire of the 
perpetrator. In these cases, the men harassed are those who fit un-
easily within established gender categories, by virtue of their aver-
sion to sexualized · talk or conduct in the workplace. The 
unreflective use of the "but for" test has led to a frequent failure to 
recognize such plaintiffs as legitimate sexual harassment claimants, 
despite the fact that their treatment reflects illuminating parallels 
with statutorily targeted forms of gender discrimination. 
Two recent cases reflect this difficulty. In Polly v. Houston 
Lighting & Power Co., 128 the plaintiff alleged that he had been ex-
posed to hostile environment sexual harassment because, inter alia, 
he "wouldn't get in ... [co-workers'] dirty conversations" and com-
plained of their use of profanity at work.129 The court, rejecting the 
magistrate's conclusion that Title VII did not prohibit harassment 
of males by other males, nonetheless read the "but for" require-
ment into the plaintiff's showing for hostile environment sexual 
harassment.13° It held that in order to demonstrate that "the har-
assment complained of was based upon sex," Polly was obliged to 
show that "but for his being male, he would not have been treated 
over gays in the military, see Kathryn Abrams, Gender in the Military: Androcentrism and 
Institutional Reform, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 217 (1993). 
On the opposite side of the coin, however, courts have not held the harassment of a male 
because he is perceived as homosexual to violate Title VII, on the grounds that this would 
extend protection to an intentionally uncovered group. See, e.g., Polly v. Houston Lighting & 
Power Co., 825 F. Supp. 135, 137 n.2 (S.D. Tex. 1993); Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d 
1081 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985); Desantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 
F. 2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979). To the extent that discrimination against gay men is actually a form 
of policing of their departures from traditional gender roles, see supra note 86, such harass-
ment may actually embody more of the gender discrimination at which the statute was aimed 
than the advances of gay supervisors would. Thus, if one were willing to consider gay men to 
be categorically ambivalent with respect to gender, see supra note 86, it would appear that the 
courts have gotten it precisely wrong in the foregoing cases. See generally Martha Chamallas, 
Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in Sexual and Racial Harassment 
Litigation, 1 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 95, 127 (1992) (noting the asymmetry in treatment of gays 
and lesbians as claimants and as perpetrators in sexual harassment cases). 
128. 825 F. Supp. 135 (S.D. Tex. 1993). 
129. 825 F. Supp. at 138. 
130. The elements of a hostile environment sexual harassment claim were established by 
Vinson v. Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). The plaintiff must demonstrate that: (i) 
she is a member of the protected class; (ii) she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harass· 
ment in the form of requests for sexual favors or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual 
nature; (iii) the harassment complained of was based on sex; (iv) the harassment unreasona· 
bly interfered with her work performance and created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive 
work environment; and (v) there is respondeat superior liability on the part of the employer. 
477 U.S. at 63-68. The "but for" test used in the cases described above applies to the third 
element, the required showing that the harassment was based on sex. 
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by his co-workers in the manner that he was."131 The court held 
that Polly's allegations of the reasons for his harassment failed to 
demonstrate that "he was harassed by his co-workers because of his 
gender"132 and granted summary judgment to defendants. 
Polly's distaste for and resistance to "dirty talk" in the work-
place was not a conventional posture for a man. It is possible that 
his colleagues were discomfited by his simultaneous conformity 
with and departure from traditional understandings of what consti-
tutes maleness and that this discomfort gave rise to harassing be-
havior. Yet the sequence of events and indeed the nature of the 
harassment itself are unclear from the brief opinion in Polly. These 
matters are more fully elaborated in an earlier case, Gol.uszek v. 
Smith, 133 which reaches the same conclusion. Goluszek was a man 
from "an unsophisticated background" who "blushe[ d] easily" and 
was "abnormally sensitive to comments pertaining to sex."134 His 
co-workers responded to his innocence and discomfort with a bar-
rage of explicit sexual comments, allegations about his sexual orien-
tation, and physical threats.135 Goluszek complained repeatedly to 
his supervisors about this treatment; while his complaints produced 
little response, he began to be cited for tardiness, improper use of 
equipment, and wasting time. When he was ultimately terminated 
for "avoidable waste of time or material,"136 he brought a Title VII 
action for sexual harassment and retaliatory termination. 
The court granted summary judgment for defendants on the sex-
ual harassment claim, applying and enhancing the "but for" show-
ing required of male plaintiffs. The court acknowledged that the 
employer might have acted differently had Goluszek been a 
woman.137 Nevertheless, it held that this should not entitle Golus-
zek to prevail when "the defendant's conduct was not the type of 
conduct Congress intended to sanction when it enacted Title 
131. 825 F. Supp. at 138. 
132. 825 F. Supp. at 138. 
133. 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988). I first read about Goluszek in Martha Chamal-
las's fine article, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in Sexual and 
Racial Harassment Litigation. See Chamallas, supra note 127, at 126-31. The following dis-
cussion reflects my debt to Professor Chamallas's insight that Goluszek was "singled out for 
harassment because he did not conform to the men's image of male heterosexuality." Id. at 
127. 
134. 697 F. Supp. at 1453. 
135. 697 F. Supp. at 1453-54. 
136. 697 F. Supp. at 1455. 
137. See 697 F. Supp. at 1456. The court noted that the employer would have been more 
likely to intervene in the harassing behavior had Goluszek been a woman; it noted one exam-
ple in which a situation complained of by a woman employee had been corrected by the 
employer. 697 F. Supp. at 1456. 
2514 Michigan .Law Review [Vol. 92:2479 
VII."138 Congress was concerned, the court stated, about discrimi-
nation that reflected and implemented a social "imbalance of 
power."139 In the context of sexual harassment, this meant "'the 
exploitation of a powerful position to impose sexual demands on an 
unwilling but less powerful person.' "140 Actionable sexual harass-
ment "fosters a sense of degradation in the victim . . . . In effect, the 
offender is saying ... that the victim is inferior because of the vic-
tim's sex.''141 Noting that Goluszek was "a male in a male-domi-
nated environment," the court concluded that he "may have been 
harassed 'because' he is a male, but that harassment was not of a 
kind that created an anti-male environment."142 
Several things are noteworthy about this opinion. First, in in-
sisting on the nexus between social disempowerment and discrimi-
nation in the workplace, the court in Goluszek imposed a 
requirement that courts felt free to omit in the cases involving ho-
mosexual supervisors. Second, both Polly and Goluszek suggest 
that to qualify as gender discrimination or sexual harassment, the 
behavior challenged must operate, in some respect, against all 
members of the protected group. In Polly, the court required proof 
that what happened to the plaintiff happened because he was a 
man: in other words, it could have happened to any man, but not to 
any woman. In Goluszek, the court took this categorical logic one 
step further: it must be treatment that not only could have hap-
pened to any man but tends to reflect negatively on men as a group 
or create an environment hostile to men. By contrast, neither a 
social nexus nor an operation against men as a group was required 
in Showalter v. Allison Reed Group, 143 a quid pro quo case in which 
a supervisor coerced two male employees to participate in the sex-
138. 697 F. Supp. at 1456. 
139. 697 F. Supp. at 1456. 
140. 697 F. Supp. at 1456 (quoting Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work 
Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1451 (1984)). 
141. 697 F. Supp. at 1456. 
142. 697 F. Supp. at 1456. 
143. 767 F. Supp. 1205 (D.R.I. 1991). A case that provides an even more recent parallel 
to Showalter is Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Wyo. 1993). In 
Chiapuzio a supervisor subjected both a husband and wife to sexually abusive remarks, the 
general import of which was that he (the supervisor) "could do a better job of making love to 
[the wife] than [her husband] could." 826 F. Supp. at 1335. The court rejected the defend· 
ant's motion for summary judgment and had no difficulty finding that plaintiff had estab-
lished a genuine issue of fact as to the "but for" requirement, because the nature of the 
harassing remarks was specific to the gender of the target - that is, the supervisor told the 
woman what acts he would like to perform with her, and the man that he could perform 
those acts better than the man could. 826 F. Supp. at 1338. In this case, as in Showalter, the 
same-sex harassment might be described as incident to or connected with cross-sex, hetero· 
sexual harassment, making it easier for courts to see it as actionable. 
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ual relationship between him and a female employee. In finding 
this conduct to be actionable sexual harassment, the court imposed 
no requirement that the environment appear "antimale" or that this 
supervisor's form of sexualization extend to men as a group. The 
court completely evaded the "but for" requirement by holding that 
the harassment of plaintiffs was on the basis of sex because it was 
"sexually motivated. "144 Although the case is in some respects dis-
tinguishable from Goluszek or Polly, 145 it reveals how easily such 
requirements can be dispensed with when a court sees a form of 
sexual harassment it finds important to address. 
These cases suggest that courts are far more sympathetic to 
male sexual harassment claimants when they present the image of a 
normative, unambiguously male subject who receives unexpected 
sexual attention from another male in the workplace. This is attrib-
utable in part to the straight male fear of the spectral homosexual 
predator, though it also appears in cases like Showalter when the 
desired sexual conduct does not have explicit homosexual over-
tones. But it is also traceable to the fact that plaintiffs such as Polly 
and Goluszek challenge accepted notions of what it means to be a 
man, or a male victim of discrimination. Their combination of male 
characteristics - XY chromosomes, male genitalia - and what are 
usually thought to be female characteristics - sexual naivete or 
aversion to sexualized talk -_ seems to make the courts as uncom-
fortable as it makes their co-workers. The courts express this dis-
comfort by asking whether discrimination against these claimants 
can be considered discrimination against men. Fueled in part by 
their skepticism about the male discrimination claim - reflected in 
the intermittent insistence on_ a nexus with social disempowerment 
- and in part by their skepticism about these mal~s, they want a 
clear and unitary definition of gender discrimination against men. 
The holy grail in these cases is a kind of mirror image of gender 
discrimination against women: at the very least, the courts require 
144. 767 F. Supp. at 1211. While it is true that this element of a quid pro quo claim is 
framed, in the relevant precedent, as a showing that "the harassment was sexually moti-
vated,'' the leading case cited by the Showalter court makes clear that this means " 'but for 
the fact of her sex, the plaintiff would not have been the object of harassment,' " just as it 
does in the hostile environment context. See Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777, 
784 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting B.T. Jones v. Flagship Intl., 793 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir. 1986)), 
cited in Showalter, 767 F. Supp. at 1211. The Showalter court's one-sentence disposition of 
this element suggests that it interpreted this requirement as meaning "motivated by the de-
sire for sex." See 767 F. Supp. at 1212 ("[T]here is no question that the harassment of the 
plaintiffs was sexually motivated."). 
145. Showalter featured the frank use of quid pro quo sexual harassment, and it managed 
to combine sexual treatment of a female employee with the discomfiting specter of coercion 
of male employees by other men. 
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some form of animus that treats men as a unified group. What the 
courts explicitly decline to do is to look beneath biological or uni-
tary classifications at the more complex social interactions they 
seek to describe and regulate. Were they to do so, they might see 
that not all men share unambivalently in the qualities socially con-
nected with maleness and that discrimination by men against men 
does not parallel gender discrimination against women but is, in 
fact, strongly colored by it. What Goluszek and Polly suffered was 
either a form of gender discrimination against women - derision 
of some of the same qualities that make women targets for sexual 
harassment - or a form of gender discrimination against men that 
disciplines not the group but a distinct subset for abandoning the 
qualities associated with men for the more socially stigmatized 
characteristics associated with women.146 Despite their targeting of 
a different group of objects, these forms of discrimination have 
more in common with broadly recognized forms of gender discrimi-
nation against women, including those associated with sexual har-
assment, than these courts are inclined to admit. 
In their response to actions by plaintiffs who claim discrimina-
tion on the basis of one characteristic but fit uneasily within the 
category with which it is associated, the courts have made some 
promising moves. They have rejected the conclusion of some mag-
istrates that Title VII bars discrimination actions by members of the 
same group. They have also reflected a greater skepticism about 
claims by men against men than by blacks against blacks. Our soci-
ety is not marked by discrimination against those qualities desig-
nated as male; those who claim to have suffered such 
discrimination, particularly at the hands of other men, should be 
required to support what might seem to be facially implausible 
claims. Yet to carry this reasoning too far misses what I described 
as the unelaborated lesson of Al-Khazraji and Shaare Tefila: that 
dynamics within a privileged group can take on the same racialized 
- or otherwise differentiated - aspect of relations between privi-
146. Chamallas explicitly endorses the first possibility and seems implicitly to favor the 
second as well when she notes that this situation is similar to those cases in which courts have 
refused to protect gay men who are harassed on the basis of their sexual orientation. See 
Chamallas, supra note 127, at 127·29. Because of these conclusions, Chamallas finds it un-
necessary to reach the question of whether such men have any kind of nexus of workplace 
and societal discrimination, which might make their vantage point on sexual harassment com-
parable to that of women. Id. at 128-29. Here I might go a step further and suggest that men 
with this ambivalent combination of gender traits are likely to have suffered in a society that 
enforces a narrow concept of the normatively male in a way that, while not duplicating the 
experience of a woman in a gendered society, at least produces some portion of the vulnera· 
bility that makes the nexus of forces particularly debilitating for women. 
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leged and nonprivileged groups, just as dynamics within the disad-
vantaged group can be marked by the same hierarchical inflections. 
The search for the other that occurs even within privileged groups 
may mean that claimants have not suffered discrimination because 
they boast qualities designated as male but because, despite their 
biological sex, they manifest qualities socially designated as female. 
In large part, courts have failed to come to terms with the com-
plex, and often unstable, arrangement of seemingly contradictory 
characteristics that comprise the subjectivity of any individual. 
Walker can be both black and white; she may seem white to her 
supervisor, Ms. Lewis, but black to the white CEO of the company. 
Goluszek can be biologically male and socially female; this combi-
nation of traits can appear more discordant in the context of a sexu-
alized workplace than in Goluszek's family or church. Rather than 
seeing such shifting combinations as a predictable characteristic of 
human beings, many courts treat them as anomalies to be swept 
under the carpet with empty analogies in Walker or Hansborough, 
or met with the demand for groupwide showings in the sexual har-
assment cases. As with the cases involving intersectional plaintiffs, 
these complex notions of subjectivity are not permitted to recast the 
courts' image of the Title VII claimant, nor are they linked to a 
theory of discrimination that could locate them within the world of 
wrongs Title VII is intended to right. How we might move toward 
these transformative understandings is the question to which I now 
tum. 
Ill. DISCRIMINATION AND THE COMPLEX LEGAL SUBJECT 
Every statutory antidiscrimination scheme is associated with a 
particular theory or understanding of discrimination. Title VII re-
flects an unusual, plural history in this regard: it has been shaped 
primarily by a view of discrimination derived from equality theory, 
and yet in recent years, it has been influenced by other theories as 
well. In this Part, I elaborate the dominant view, explaining how it 
informs the outcomes in the preceding cases and, particularly, how 
it has impeded recognition and accommodation of the complex 
legal subject. But while I highlight the elements of the dominant 
theory that would need to be modified in order to make central the 
circumstances of complex claimants, I also explore the alternate in-
terpretations - the minor themes of Title VII enforcement - that 
have emerged in doctrinal contexts such as disparate impact or sex-
ual harassment. I conclude by discussing how doctrinal areas re-
flecting alternative understandings of discrimination might be used 
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to bring about changes necessary to respond to intersectional and 
categorically ambivalent claimants. 
A. The Dominant Account 
Title VII was enacted, and was originally litigated, under an 
equality-based account of discrimination. According to this theory, 
protected groups, such as women or racial minorities, were under-
stood to be substantially similar to the normative group - white 
men - for all purposes related to employment.147 Title VII ad-
dressed the arbitrary or biased failures to recognize these similari-
ties - failures that impeded the progress of protected groups in the 
workplace. 
Since the early years of its enforcement, one primary form of 
discrimination targeted by Title VII has been any action by the em-
ployer that communicates the judgment "You shouldn't have this 
job because you're an .X," when X designates a protected group.14s 
TI1is judgment might be spoken, in terms that relate an adverse em-
ployment decision to the plaintiff's categorical identity or to some 
stereotype that captures the employer's view of that identity. It 
might be inferable from action - from a pattern or practice in hir-
ing, firing, or promotion that treats members of a protected group 
differently from the normative group.149 True to its origins in 
equality theory, this approach takes the differential between the 
subject group and the white male norm to be the most salient aspect 
of the judgment, so the particular imagery that is used to denigrate 
the group in question - and the great variability it displays - is 
147. For thoughtful iterations of the equality-based account of discrimination, including 
but not specifically limited to the context of Title VII, see Wendy W. Williams, Tlte Equality 
Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175 
(1982), and Richard A. Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Ap· 
proach lo the Topics, 24 UCLA L. REv. 581 (1977). 
148. It is this type of judgment that is the target of the McDonnell Douglas test and that 
is flushed out of circumspect defendants by numerical showings. See McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
149. Such practices may be targeted, under a disparate treatment theory, as proxies for 
the discriminatory judgments described above. See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers in Para· 
dise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 M1cH. L. 
REv. 59, 67 (1972) (presenting three concepts of discrimination, and noting that" '[u]nequal 
treatment' ... may be evidence of racial animus"). Unlike many accounts of employment 
discrimination, which distinguish primarily between disparate treatment and disparate impact 
concepts, Blumrosen's account identifies three concepts, effectively separating disparate 
treatment into two categories: "(d]iscrimination consist(ing] of acts causing economic harm 
to an individual that are motivated by personal antipathy to the group of which that individ-
ual is a member" and "(d]iscrimination consist[ing] of causing economic harm to an individ· 
ual by treating members of his minority group in a different and less favorable manner that 
similarly situated members of the majority group." Id. As noted above, acts in the second 
category may sometimes be treated as proxies for acts in the first. 
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frequently ignored. The judgments of differential competence that 
are the focus of this approach are viewed as being chosen, or stum-
bled upon, by the fully formed subjects who hold them; they have 
little role in constituting either the perpetrators or their victims. 
This approach also presents each discriminatory judgment as if it 
were held in analytic and epistemological isolation from other judg-
ments about the differential capacity of groups. This premise or 
appearance of isolation can be maintained because the relationships 
between the judgments that operate in the workplace and constella-
tions of discriminatory attitudes and structures that pervade social 
life beyond the workplace are never systematically discussed.150 
The advent of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.151 and the disparate 
impact standard worked some changes in this understanding. Judg-
ments of differential capacity ceased to be the exclusive touchstone 
of Title VII cases: the statute also targeted facially neutral employ-
ment standards or practices that erected disproportionate barriers 
to protected groups, unjustified by business necessity.152 This 
broadened the focus from employer prejudice to insensitive or mo-
tivationally innocent institutional arrangements that perpetuated 
the effects of longstanding societal discrimination.153 It looked be-
yond the workplace to glimpse one form of interaction between em-
ployment practices and larger patterns of discrimination.154 
Disparate impact is not, moreover, the only area of Title VII 
doctrine that has diverged from the equality-based disparate treat-
150. One factor in the reluctance to draw connections between workplace and broader 
social discrimination may be a concern that an emphasis on society-wide patterns is the first 
step toward the justification of race- or gender-conscious relief by reference to societal dis-
crimination. For thoughtful progressive critiques of the societal-discrimination strategy for 
justifying race- or gender-conscious remedies, see Drew S. Days III, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 
453 (1987), and Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action 
Cases, 100 HARV. L. REv. 78 (1986). While I am less skeptical of "societal discrimination" 
justifications for race- and gender-conscio_us remedies than Sullivan and Days are, I do not 
believe that these justifications would inevitably be entailed by an effort to connect discrimi-
nation in the workplace to discrimination in the social world beyond. 
151. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
152. 401 U.S. at 429-33; see also Blumrosen, supra note 149, at 78-81. For an interestingly 
distinct view of Griggs, see George Schatzski, United Steelworkers of America v. Weber: An 
Exercise in Understandable Indecision, 56 WASH. L. REV. 51, 61-63 {1980) (arguing that the 
decision to focus on employment criteria that are not discriminatorily motivated reflects a 
desire for a more racially balanced workforce). 
153. See Blumrosen, supra note 149, at 71. For a discussion of why racially selective in-
sensitivity violates the antidiscrimination principle, in employment discrimination and else-
where, see Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, I975 Term - Foreword: In Defense of the 
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1 {1976). 
154. For a more complete discussion of this feature of the disparate impact approach, see 
infra notes 174-83 and accompanying text. 
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ment framework. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA),155 
though framed in the equality-based terms of the primary statutory 
guarantee, requires employers to accommodate the difference of a 
protected group;156 the same can be said of Title VII's requirement 
of reasonable accommodation of religion.157 Sexual harassment 
claims reflect perhaps the greatest divergence from the dominant 
understanding: they address those abuses of power that import the 
sexualized domination of women that pervades the larger society 
into the employment context. Not only do they target a form of 
discrimination that involves more than judgments of differential ca-
pacity; they view discrimination in the workplace as replicating and 
complicating patterns of discrimination enacted elsewhere - pat-
terns that shape the self-understanding of those they victimize,158 
Yet, notwithstanding their variety, all these understandings of 
discrimination under Title VII partake, to a greater or lesser extent, 
of several assumptions. These assumptions help to explain the out-
comes in those cases involving complex claimants surveyed above. 
First, Title VII doctrine assumes that the members of a protected 
group are easily identifiable. Characteristics such as race and gen-
der are understood to be biologically given, 159 and biological trans-
155. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e(k) (1988)), provides that sex discrimination includes discrimination 
on the basis of pregnancy. The PDA was an amendment to Title VII added to respond to the 
Supreme Court's decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
156. The justification for this accommodation may be expressed in equality-based terms 
as well; it permits women, as well as men, to combine family life with workforce participa-
tion. See California Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987). 
157. The extent of this accommodation, however, remains a matter of doctrinal contro-
versy. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (addressing the extent 
of accommodation required of the employer of a sabbatarian). 
158. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 123, at 1-23. For a more complete discussion of 
the divergent assumptions of sexual harassment doctrine, see infra notes 140-83 and accom-
panying text. 
159. Biological transmission is usually understood to be the source of the immutability 
that is often invoked to justify the legal protection of such characteristics. See Owen M. Fiss, 
A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 235, 241-42 (1971) (discussing the 
absence of individual control over race as justifying a prohibition on the use of racial crite· 
rion for employment decisions); see also Schatzski, supra note 152, at 55. Some alternative 
accounts of discrimination have involved notions of protected characteristics that are not 
biologically grounded. See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & 
Pus. AFF. 107, 147, 155 (1976) (stating that some "social groups" protected under "group-
disadvantaging principle" may be defined in terms of characteristics that are neither biologi-
cal nor immutable, such as alienage). Another example of the assumption that race - or 
gender -is a biologically given rather than socially constructed characteristic may be found 
in cases regarding hairstyle. See Paulette Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Inter-
section of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365. In discussing Rogers v. American Airlines, 
527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), and other cases in which courts have upheld employers' 
prohibitions on braided hairstyles as not constituting discrimination on the basis of race, 
Caldwell argues that the courts' conception of race is almost exclusively biological. Caldwell, 
supra, at 378 ("Braids ... are ... a cultural practice - and are therefore mutable, i.e., the 
' 
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m1ss1on is in tum associated with fixity and lack of ambiguity. 
There is always the possibility of a claimant who reflects a mixed 
biological legacy, as in Walker, or whose appearance does not re-
flect what is conventionally understood to be his biological endow-
ment, as in Plessy v. Ferguson. 160 But such cases are regarded as 
exceptional and are usually dispatched by recourse to some readily 
applicable rule.161 Thus, even in the context of sexual harassment, 
the biological understanding of protected characteristics makes it 
difficult for courts to see in claims of men like Polly or Goluszek the 
kinds of gender discrimination Title VII proscribes.162 
Second, in order to be considered discrimination against group 
X, the employer's judgment -· which may posit employment-
related incapacity or generalized inferiority (disparate treatment, 
sexual harassment) or reflect insensitivity to the group's social cir-
cumstances (disparate impact) - must be applicable to the group 
as a whole.163 Discriminatory judgments are understood to apply to 
the group as a whole when they are applicable to all subgroups or 
are aimed at persons who are not distinguished by any group-based 
characteristics other than that designated X 164 Because all people 
have many such characteristics, these paradigmatic persons are 
likely to be those whose non-X characteristics are accorded suffi-
cient privilege to render them invisible for statutory purposes - for 
result of choice."). Because the black female worker can alter her hairstyle - regardless of 
the cost of such mandatory alteration for her culturally defined sense of racial identity -
employers are permitted to proscribe the wearing of braids. Id. at 378-79. 
160. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Plessy argued that he was "seven[-]eighths Caucasian and 
one[-]eighth African blood; that the mixture of colored blood was not discernible in him, and 
that he was entitled to every recognition, right, privilege and immunity secured to the citizens 
of the United States of the white race." 163 U.S. at 538. The fact that he was viewed as black 
according to conventional norms of the time, however, is suggested by the fact that he was 
arrested for refusing to vacate his seat in a railway coach reserved for whites. For a fascinat-
ing discussion of this element of Plessy's challenge in relation to his broader challenge to the 
system of segregation, see Crenshaw, supra note 18, at 1298. 
161. For example, the Court in Plessy held that the issue of Plessy's proper racial classifi-
cation was a matter of state law. See 163 U.S. at 552. 
162. See supra section 11.B.2. 
163. See Blumrosen, supra note 149, at 72 ("Discrimination of the type prohibited by 
Title VII is a class- or group-oriented phenomenon that challenges the status of every mem-
ber of the class."). Blumrosen notes that this feature of the discrimination targeted by Title 
VII has become particularly apparent with the advent of the disparate impact approach. Id .. . 
A notion that actionable discrimination operates against a group as a whole also appears to 
be implicit in Brest's "antidiscrimination principle," which targets actions or decisions that 
"seem[ ] to reflect assumptions of racial inferiority or selective indifference and ... seem[ ] 
likely to inflict stigmatic injury or add to cumulative harms." Brest, supra note 153, at 21. 
164. See Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, supra note 25, at 
143-46 {discussing the reluctance of courts to certify black women as class representatives in 
cases alleging gender discrimination because of concerns that what they have suffered is not 
characteristic of the discrimination suffered by "women" in a particular workplace). 
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example, white women are only distinguished by gender, but Latina 
women are distinguished by race and gender. There are times when 
discrimination against a subgroup may be targeted under Title VII 
law: the "sex-plus" doctrine is a good example.165 But doctrines 
such as sex-plus function less as means of recognizing the variable 
and highly contextualized faces of gender discrimination than as 
means of preventing the strategic deployment of ostensibly neutral 
categories, such as marriage or parental status, to defeat the more 
general purposes of the statute.166 When Title VII does target dis-
crimination against a subgroup, its goal is understood to be ancil-
lary to, and less important than, stopping the implementation of 
discriminatory judgments applicable to the group as a whole. For 
example, the sex-plus doctrine can easily be cabined, as in Judge v. 
Marsh, 167 without undermining the force or direction of Title VII 
enforcement. 
Third, actions or judgments that are most readily understood to 
be discrimination against group X are made by members of another 
group.16s Discriminatory judgments arise from irrational animus, 
165. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text. 
166. Explaining the purpose of the sex-plus doctrine, the court in Jefferies cited Judge 
Brown's dissent from the Fifth Circuit's decision and denial of rehearing in Martin Mariella. 
Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Assn., 615 F.2d 1025, 1033 (5th Cir. 1980) (cit-
ing Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 416 F.2d 1257, 1260 {5th Cir. 1969) (Brown, J., dissent-
ing from denial of rehearing)). The Fifth Circuit's opinion was ultimately reversed by the 
Supreme Court. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 {1971). The Jefferies court 
endorsed Judge Brown's conclusion that refusal to consider sex-plus discrimination under 
Title VII would "completely undermine the Act." 615 F.2d at 1032. " 'Free to add non-sex 
factors, the rankest sort of discrimination against women can be worked by employers. This 
could include, for example, all sorts of physical characteristics, such as minimum weight •.. , 
minimum shoulder width, minimum biceps measurement, minimum lifting capacity ... and 
the like.'" 615 F.2d at 1033 (quoting 416 F.2d at 1260). Judge Brown's concern seems to be 
either that employers would deploy ostensibly neutral criteria that actually captured the vast 
majority of the female sex - such as shoulder width, biceps measurement, and lifting capac-
ity - or that employers. would deploy one, possibly pretextual, neutral category after an-
other until most women were covered. 
167. 649 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1986); see supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. 
168. My argument here is not that there is any statutory or judge-made rule preventing 
recognition of discrimination among members of the same statutory group. In fact, cases 
such as Walker and Hansborough, and EEOC advisories such as the sexual harassment Com· 
pliance Manual discussed supra in note 125, indicate that legal decisionmakers are, on occa-
sion, willing to acknowledge the possibility of discrimination within a statutory group. My 
point is that such patterns of discrimination are treated as anomalous or inherently problem-
atic as the basis for Title VII claims. There is an initial assumption of implausibility that a 
plaintiff seems to be required to defeat in order to prevail; this is indicated most clearly in a 
case such as Hansborough, which imposes an enhanced burden of proof on a plaintiff who 
would allege intragroup discrimination. See supra notes 103-10 and accompanying text. My 
point is that this entrenched doctrinal skepticism about intragroup discrimination reflects 
both sound reasoning - because members of the same statutory group may have similarities 
in background and socialization, there is some reason to believe that disputes among them 
may be attributed to personal animosity rather than group-related animus - and unsound 
reasoning - because courts have treated group membership as an unambiguous question to 
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ignorance, or error. 'IJlere is little reason to believe that a person 
would be ignorant, mistaken, or intolerant of qualities he possesses 
himself, particularly when his attitudes are not understood to be 
integrally shaped by any broader social structures. Thus, when a 
judgment against a person in group Xis made by another person in 
group X, it is assumed to be the result of personal antagonism, 
rather than group-based beliefs. This assumption seems to animate 
the skeptical demand for antimale animus in the Goluszek case.169 
The courts have strayed from this assumption in particular cases: 
Walker, for example, permitted a departure because the category X 
- race - could be subdivided and adjudicated according to an-
other protected category - color.17° But the necessity of this 
reclassification, or of the imposition of additional burdens of proof 
in cases such as Goluszek and Hansborough, 111 suggests the impor-
tance of the general rule: cases that depart from the assumption of 
discrimination as an intergroup phenomenon are treated as anoma-
lous and are circuitously or unsatisfactorily explained. 
A fourth assumption, reflected more fully in the dominant un-
derstanding of discrimination, is that discriminatory actions or judg-
ments are workplace-specific barriers that hinder employment 
opportunity, rather than parts of a larger system of discrimination 
that shapes the consciousness of those subject to it or intersects 
with other systems of discrimination. Under the equality theory 
that informs disparate treatment law, individuals are formed prior 
to social interaction. If these individuals are perpetrators of dis-
crimination, they assume discriminatory attitudes through igno-
rance, irrationality, or conscious choice; if they are victims, they 
be resolved by reference to biology, they have missed many kinds of ambivalence inherent in 
group membership that are capable of producing harmful discriminatory dynamics among 
people ostensibly within the same statutory group. My goal in this essay is to expose and 
address the portion of judicial skepticism on this point that is attributable to unsound reason-
ing. The inquiry I propose is sufficiently contextual, see infra section 111.B.2, that it seems 
unlikely to produce significant overprotection of intragroup discrimination - that is, findings · 
of intragroup discrimination in cases where non·group-based interpersonal animosity is a 
better explanation - although this is always a possibility when new categories or subcatego-
ries of conduct are made actionable. A recent Supreme Court decision that seems to employ 
the assumption that discrimination on the basis of a protected trait does not occur among 
members of the same (protected) group is St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 
(1993). In concluding that the plaintiff had not been demoted and discharged on the basis of 
race, both the district court and Justice Scalia's majority opinion for the Supreme Court place 
emphasis on the fact that two blacks sat on the disciplinary review board that recommended 
disciplining the plaintiff, who was also black. See lP S. Ct. at 2748 n.2; Hicks v. St. Mary's 
Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1252 (E.D. Mo. 1991). 
169. See supra notes 133-42 and accompanying text. 
170. See supra notes 91-117 and accompanying text. 
171. See supra notes 103-10 and accompanying text. 
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encounter these attitudes as impediments to their at least partially 
autonomous progress through the workplace.172 In neither case do 
these attitudes, in any important sense, constitute the self-concep-
tion or subjectivity of those who hold them. Judges and advocates 
who embrace this view make no effort to link discriminatory judg-
ments in the workplace to those that operate outside, beyond ob-
serving that they may be animated by similar ignorance or 
prejudiced irrationality. To look for social patterns that are not 
specifically traceable to the judgments of particular individuals is to 
depart from the focus on individual human agency that is assumed 
to be the predicate of legal responsibility.113 
Disparate impact and sexual harassment law attempt to connect 
discrimination in the workplace to larger social patterns; they see 
discrimination as perpetrated by interactions more various than the 
culpable actions of individuals. Yet neither body of doctrine has 
offered a developed - or even explicit - account of the participa-
tion of a range of institutions, including the workplace, in social pat-
terns of discrimination; and neither has described, in more than 
general terms, the ways that systems of discrimination shape or con-
stitute those who are subject to them. 
Disparate impact doctrine has highlighted a link between dis-
crimination in the workplace and in the larger social world: it de-
scribes the way that practices in the workplace may perpetuate, or 
freeze in place, discrimination enacted in other social institutions.174 
Yet the doctrine suggests only one of many possible relations. 
Moreover, its emphasis on the motivational innocence of the em-
ployer175 and its marginalization within antidiscrimination doctrine 
172. For an account of discrimination that closely reflects this view, see Wasserstrom, 
supra note 147. 
173. See Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, supra note 159, at 145. Fiss argues 
that under the dominant understanding of discrimination, a practice of means-ends scrutiny 
he refers to as the "antidiscrimination principle," arguments that emphasize social - or 
"global" - patterns of discrimination by invoking "past discrimination" sever "connections 
between victim and beneficiary and between past perpetrator and present cost-bearer." Id. 
This inevitably weakens such arguments because they have "ceased ... [to be] about the 
perpetuation of past discrimination in any individualized sense." Id. The assumption that 
there should be individualized responsibility for discrimination is not a feature of the domi-
nant approach with which Fiss necessarily agrees, but he sees it at the heart of the current 
antidiscrimination enforcement regime. In the article cited, Fiss is referring primarily to the 
Equal Protection Clause when he discusses antidiscrimination law, yet the general principles 
he articulates are relevant to Title VII law, particularly in the area of disparate treatment and 
more generally in the sense that remediation under Title VII is limited by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
174. See Blumrosen, supra note 149, at 70; Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 
supra note 159, at 239. 
175. This is not in all respects a drawback: permitting recovery in the context of motiva-
tional innocence lightens the burden on the plaintiff and suggests that even those who do not 
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as a whole176 have prevented it from stimulating inquiry into other 
ways in which employment discrimination may exploit or replicate 
social patterns. Sexual harassment doctrine has been suggestive of 
other relations between the workplace and the larger society: har-
assment is sometimes described as exacerbating women's sexual 
subordination by linking it to their economic disempowerment,177 
or as importing into the ostensibly level ground of the workplace 
the sexual subordination that characterizes other social contexts.178 
But courts have not consistently placed this social constructivist 
gloss on the sexual harassment claim. Sometimes sexual harass-
ment is construed as a more straightforward violation of women's 
equality: Justice Ginsburg's recent opinion in Harris v. Forklift Sys-
tems, Inc. 179 describes harassment as making it "'more difficult'" 
for women, as opposed to men, to perform their assigned jobs.18° 
Moreover, judicial recourse to social context is not always associ-
ated with liberatory goals: some courts have cited the level of sexu-
alized abuse observable in society at large to deny plaintiffs' claims 
of injury.181 And only in the invocation of the "reasonable woman" 
standard - a standard recently rejected by the Supreme Court182 
- does one see a clear suggestion that the subject is influenced or 
hold prejudiced attitudes can perpetuate discrimination - both important assets in the 
broadening of employment protections. 
176. This marginalization has been effected largely through judicial interpretation of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 
229 {1976) (rejecting a constitutional disparate impact claim and insisting on a showing of 
discriminatory motivation). For a thoughtful effort to ground the disparate impact approach 
according to the norms of the preexisting antidiscrimination paradigm, see Brest, supra note 
153. To the extent that Schatzski is correct that the disparate impact approach reflects an 
effort to implement affirmative action, see supra note 152, it may also have been marginalized 
by constitutional doctrine contracting the scope of race-conscious remedies. See, e.g., City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265 (1978). 
177. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 123, at 1-23. 
178. See, e.g., GUTEK, supra note 3, at 133-37; Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination 
and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 V AND. L. REv. 1183, 1202-09 (1989); Note, 
supra note 140, at 1451-52. This view is also articulated in some cases, including those that 
ultimately articulate restrictive views of actionable sexual harassment. See, e.g., Goluszek v. 
Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Ill. 1988) {describing sexual harassment as involving the 
exploitation of previously existing power inequalities). 
179. 114 S. Ct. 367 {1993). 
180. 114 S. Ct. at 372 (quoting Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir. 
1988)). 
181. See e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 622 (6th Cir. 1986) {denying 
recovery when the extent of pornographic display did not seem excessive in light of represen-
tations to which women are frequently exposed outside the workplace). 
182. See, 114 S. Ct. at 370 {holding that Title VII targets harassing conduct that is severe 
or pervasive enough to create "an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or 
abusive" (emphasis added)). 
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shaped by discrimination to the point that her perceptions of partic-
ular conduct may differ from those of the normative group.1s3 
The reluctance of courts - across the range of Title VII doc-
trines - to make explicit the ways that systems of discrimination 
operate and intersect, or shape the consciousness of the subject, has 
created a doctrine that is blind to many discriminatory dynamics. It 
makes judges capable, in cases like Walker, of describing discrimi-
nation on the basis of "color" or "ethnicity" as distinct phenomena 
not integrally connected to race. A discriminatory judgment about 
group X is an individual expression of ignorance or predilection: it 
is not shaped by broader social attitudes about X, through which 
one might uncover links to attitudes about Y or Z. Such a doctrine 
is also capable of placing intragroup conduct, such as that in Golus-
zek, beyond the pale of coverage. Because it fails to focus on social 
patterns of discrimination or the ways that such discrimination 
shapes the subject, it neglects the sense in which action within a 
given group may reflect devaluation of, or a need to assert a hierar-
chical relation to, those outside it. 
B. The Challenge of Complex Claimants 
Illuminating these four assumptions underlying Title VII doc-
trine - (i) that protected traits are biologically transmitted, (ii) that 
discriminatory judgments are broadly applicable, (iii) that discrimi-
nation is an intergroup phenomenon, and (iv) that discrimination is 
specific to the workplace and distinct from broader social patterns -
explains many things about the cases involving complex legal sub-
jects. It -explains why discrimination against a multiply constituted 
subgroup looks anomalous - a partial phenomenon not to be con-
fused with the real thing. If generality of application is one of the 
distinguishing features of group-based discrimination and the para-
digmatic victims are distinguished from the norm only by the pos-
session of a single, stigmatized trait, then more focused forms of 
discrimination, targeting groups that are multiply marked, are 
bound to seem distinct, as matters of local rather than more univer-
sal interest. Similarly, if discriminatory judgments about particular 
groups are thought to be distinct, lacking the grounding in social 
structures or configurations that might establish connections or par-
allels between them, it is hardly surprising that aggregation -
183. For thoughtful elaborations of how the reasonable woman's perspective is socially 
constructed, in salient part through the experience of gender oppression, see Ellison v. 
Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-81 (9th Cir. 1991); Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, 626 A.2d 445, 475-79 
(N.J. 1993) (involving a New Jersey state analog to Title VII). 
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rather than interaction or intersection - is the main way courts 
have seen fit to deal with claims by women of color. These features 
of the dominant account of discrimination also help to explain why 
the categorically ambivalent, who cite discrimination by members 
of their own groups, are treated as oddities who must surmount ex-
ceptional barriers of proof in order to prevail on their anomalous 
claims. This view of discrimination takes membership in a statutory 
group as biologically given and permanently fixed; it contains no 
explanation of how distinctions might arise within groups or of how 
group members might come to devalue those who are facially or 
substantially similar. These points of tension should lead us to ask: 
What changes in this view of discrimination would be necessary to 
make such complex ciaimants mainstream rather than marginal 
players in Title VII doctrine and to provide a full account of the 
kinds of discrimination they suffer? 
1. Conceptual Shifts 
Modifying the four assumptions enumerated above ·requires 
legal advocates and decisionmakers to revise their views of two crit-
ical concepts: the nature and operation of discriminatory judg-
ments, and the characteristics that statutory categories are intended 
to protect. Underlying each of these reconceptualizations, how-
ever, is a vision of the social construction of the subject, and the 
role of discrimination in that process, that must also be imple-
mented in order fully to accommodate the complex subject. 
a. The nature and operation of discriminatory judgments. The 
first set of necessary changes concern the nature and operation of 
discriminatory judgments: how they arise, how they are con~ected 
to other structures of oppression or systems of belief, how they 
shape those who hold them and those to whom they are applied. In 
order for courts squarely to address the claims of the complex sub-
ject, they must reconceive discrimination, not as a judgment of con-
trasting capacity that is offered to justify differentiation, but as a 
judgment of devaluation that effects disempowerment. Catharine 
MacKinnon has played a pivotal role in shifting the emphasis in 
discussions of gender discrimination from a focus on women's dif-
ferences from men to a focus on men's domination of women 
through sexual objectification.184 While this analysis has informed 
some portions of sexual harassment doctrine, it has yet to reach the 
184. See CATHARINE MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance, in FEMINISM UNMODI-
FIED, supra note 8, at 32. For a complementary argument grounded in the social sciences, see 
SANDRA L. BEM, THE LENSES OF GENDER (1993). 
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basic understandings beneath many areas of Title VII law. The 
question in these areas is still whether an employer has expressed a 
judgment of differential capacity, not how such judgments shape 
the institutional position and self-conception of affected employees. 
As decisionmakers shift their focus to judgments of devaluation 
that justify and effect disempowerment, including judgments of dif-
ferential capacity, it will be easier to observe themes and patterns in 
devaluative imagery that will enhance the understanding of inter-
sectional discrimination. 
One important theme is the variability and malleability of those 
judgments by which outsider groups are devalued. Not only are 
perpetrators capable of modifying the forms of their derision when 
certain kinds of judgments are proscribed by a legal antidiscrimina-
tion regime - a pattern, for example, that has made undisguised 
judgments of the form "you shouldn't do this job because you're an 
X" increasingly rare. But apart from the effects of regulation, de-
valuation assumes many guises that often track the specific charac-
teristics of its targets.185 Women may be described as overly 
emotional or irrational, as vessels for the bearing of the next gener-
ation, as moral mothers unfit to withstand the insults of an ugly 
public world, as lazy dependents on government largesse, as in-
nocents whose sexual purity requires male protective vigilance, as 
willful or promiscuous manipulators of male sexuality. As the last 
two descriptions indicate, such characterizations may take the form 
of a dichotomy, in which each pole is devalued in distinctive fash-
ion. New characterizations and dichotomies may also emerge in re-
lation to salient social changes: the surge in professional women in 
185. For thoughtful feminist accounts that describe gender discrimination as consisting of 
multiple discriminatory strategies or devaluative images, see MARY JoE FRuo, POSTMODERN 
LEGAL FEMINISM 129-31 (1992) {describing the terrorization, maternalization, and sexualiza-
tion of women and female bodies), and Christine A. Littleton, Equality and Feminist Legal 
Theory, 48 P1rr. L. REV. 1043, 1045-46 {1987) (describing women as subject to sex discrimi-
nation, gender oppression, and sexual subordination). 
Interestingly, a related argument may be found in the later work of Catharine MacKin-
non. Responding to arguments that the unity of her theory of sexualized domination ex-
cludes the experiences of minority women, MacKinnon argues that there is particularization 
by race and other characteristics even within the dynamic of sexualized oppression: 
The treatment of women in pornography shows this approach in graphic relief. One 
way or another, all women are in pornography. African-American women are featured 
in bondage, struggling, in cages, as animals, insatiable .... Asian women are passive, 
inert, as if dead, tortured unspeakably. Latinas are hot mommas. Fill in the rest from 
every demeaning and hostile racial stereotype you know; it is sex here ...• 
I am saying, each woman is in pornography as the embodiment of her particularities. 
This is not in tension with being there "as a woman," it is what being there as a woman 
means. Her specificity makes up what gender is. 
Catharine MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What ls a White Woman Anyway?, 4 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13, 20-21 {1991). 
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the workplace has been accompanied by new dichotomies, such as 
the insufficiently assertive female versus the aggressive bitch, 186 or 
the ruthless, childless career woman versus the unreliable work-
and-family woman.187 Gender discrimination may insinuate itself 
into other oppressive frameworks by particularizing - for exam-
ple, by sexualizing - the devaluative images applied to a group not 
primarily defined by gender. For example, black feminist theorists 
have described the ways in which the animalistic metaphors used to 
dehumanize blacks have been infused with sexual particularity to 
construct black men as predators and black women as insatiable 
and promiscuous.188 Thus, a glimpse at the range of images through 
which subordination occurs reveals both variation and common 
th,emes: a similarity of devaluative practices across different , 
groups, and intersection and mutual reinforcement among different 
systems of discrimination. 
Understanding discrimination as devaluation, however, means 
more than noting the varied forms that it takes. It also means un-
derstanding the way it effects the diseJl!powerment of its subjects. 
This understanding in tum requires a more constructivist view of 
the formation of the subject, as well as of the effects of discrimina-
tion. The dominant approach posits a world of fully formed beings, 
who either embrace or are thwarted by opinions of differential ca-
pacity. The move toward discrimination as devaluation requires an 
understanding of the way discrimination helps form the subject. 
Devaluative imagery employed in the workplace rests on and reso-
nates with a complicated system of cultural myths, images, and ste-
reotypes, which are reflected in many other social institutions and 
practices.189 An employer who refers to a female worker as a "nice 
186. Mary Radford offers a useful discussion of the way in which both sides of this dichot-
omy have been subject to devaluation in the contemporary workplace. See Mary F. Radford, 
Sex Stereotyping and the Promotion of Women to Positions of Power, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 471, 
487-89 (1990) (providing a hypothetical illustrating the multidimensional character of sex 
stereotyping, and suggesting that even a single person may occupy both sides of the dichot-
omy, being seen by some as too abrasive and by others as too emoti9nal). 
187. Anna Marie Smith has argued that, particularly as reflected in recent films such as 
FATAL A TIRACTION (Paramount Pictures Corp. 1987) or THE PAPER (Universal Studios, Inc. 
1994), the well-rounded family woman versus the childless career woman is the contempo1 
rary recycling of the "madonna versus whore" dichotomy. Conversation with Anna Ma.rie 
Smith, Assistant Professor of Government, Cornell University, in Ithaca, N.Y. (Feb. 3, 1994). 
188. See Crenshaw, Whose Story ls It Anyway?, supra note 25, at 411 (discussing images 
of black women as "sexually voracious," "sexually indiscriminate," and amenable to copula-
tion "with animals •.. apes and monkeys"); Jacquelyn D. Hall, "The Mind that Burns in Each 
Body": Women, Rape and Racial Violence, in THE POWERS OF DESIRE 328, 334 (Ann Snitow 
et al. eds., 1983) (discussing an image of a" 'black rapist'" as" 'a monstrous beast, crazed 
with lust'" (quoting CHARLES H. STEMBER, SEXUAL RACISM 23 (1976))). 
189. This understanding is articulated throughout the literature of feminism and critical 
race theory. For thought-provoking examples, see Crenshaw, Whose Story ls It Anyway?, 
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piece" or derides her as a "dumb bitch" is not originating novel 
images; he is invoking images with elaborate resonance in the famil-
ial, social, or educational experience of most women in this soci-
ety.190 Sustained exposure to these images in a variety of contexts 
shapes our vision of ourselves. If we are the targets of such im-
agery, it causes us to second-guess our interpretation of our ac-
tions;191 it limits our .sense of our possibilities by making some 
choices more plausible than others.192 If we are the perpetrators or 
beneficiaries of such imagery, it also shapes our self-conceptions. 
This backdrop of cultural imagery not only establishes our position 
in the social hierarchy but also shapes the opinions we hold. 
Devaluative or discriminatory assumptions are not simply chosen 
by us, as equality theorists sometimes suggest, because they already 
influence the environment in which we exercise choice, 193 making 
supra note 25; Williams, supra note 9; Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal 
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). It is also a 
central premise of recent literature advocating the regulation of pornography or hate speech. 
See CATHARINE A. MAcK1NNON, ONLY WORDS (1993); MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS 
THAT WOUND (1993). 
190. Another recent example of such a practice arose during the struggle over the nomi-
nation of Lani Guinier as head of the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department. Oppo-
nents of Guinier widely characterized her as a "quota queen": not only did the factually 
incorrect suggestion of Guinier's commitment to quotas suggest an effort to create resonance 
with the highly controversial policy of affirmative action, but the use of the term queen -
utterly unnecessary beyond its feeble alliterative value - reflected an attempt to associate 
Guinier with welfare queens - a category of ostensibly undeserving, largely black benefi-
ciaries of the government's statutory largesse. For a discussion of the negative imagery sur-
rounding the recipients of welfare, see NANCY FRASER, UNRULY PRACTICES: POWER, 
DISCOURSE, AND GENDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY 151-56 (1989). 
191. For example, the concern or worry reported by many women that they are somehow 
implicated in their own sexual harassment or coercion is in part attributable to cultural narra-
tives that emphasize women's control over and manipulation of male sexuality. For striking 
iterations of such narratives by contemporary men, see TIMOTHY BENEKE, MEN oN RAPE 
(1982). 
192. For a wonderfully illuminating example, see Leslie G. Espinoza, Masks and Other 
Disguises: Exposing Legal Academia, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1878, 1878 (1990) (relating her 
childhood fear that despite her efforts and ambitions she would grow up to be a hairdresser, 
like all the other women in her Latino family). I also like Espinoza's story because its ending 
- she ultimately became a law professor - illustrates that the force of such social expecta-
tions, while strongly influential, is not wholly determinative of the actions of those subject to 
it. 
193. My suggestion here is that such structures of discrimination, while formative and 
constraining, do not wholly exclude the possibility of agency on the part of those subject to 
them. Rosemary Coombe and Vicki Schultz have referred to such structures "not [as) 'barri-
ers' to human activity but rather the 'fields' in which that activity occurs" - stressing also 
that the" 'fields' themselves exist only as the product of [collective] human creation." See 
Vicki Schultz, Room to Maneuver (/)or a Room of One's Own? Practice Theory and Feminist 
Practice, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 123, 135-36 (1989) (citing Rosemary J. Coombe, Room for 
Manoeuver: Toward a Theory of Practice in Critical Legal Studies, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 
69, 90 (1989)). Schultz acknowledges the constraint imposed by such fields but also high-
lights the possibilities of agency within them, particularly when exercised through collective 
action. Id. at 137-44. Thus, she urges theorists to go farther than Coombe's "deconstruct[ion 
of) structure" to attend to the range of contextual factors that make it easier for some groups 
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some descriptions, images, and hierarchies appear more coherent 
than others.194 Viewed in this way, employment discrimination rep-
resents, not a chosen course of institutionally specific conduct, but a 
reiterative practice that further enmeshes us in, and shapes us ac-
cording to, oppressive social patterns. 
Reconceiving discrimination in these ways would offer many in-
sights germane to the circumstances of complex claimants.195 It 
would suggest, first, that there is no ground for privileging, in an 
antidiscrimination regime, discriminatory judgments that are gen-
eral in their application to a group. Although some of the images 
through which women are devalued and socially or politically domi-
nated apply to the entire group, much of the power of gender dis-
crimination as a system arises from its particularity and variability 
- its capacity to encompass and explain many different groups of 
women. Thus judgments that apply to some women - be they sex-
ually active women or mothers or black women - are equally im-
portant to the system of discrimination, and especially gender 
discrimination, despite their particularity.196 Second, reconceiving 
discrimination would help explain how some compound forms of 
discrimination are intersectional rather than merely aggregative.197 
or actors than others to exercise such resistant agency. Id. It is this sort of image, of contex-
tually differential agency within systematic constraint, that I mean to convey when I refer to 
"social construction." 
194. Kimberle Crenshaw explains, for example, how the white solipsism of feminist dis-
course and the androcentrism of antiracist discourse made Anita Hill's account of the harass-
ment of a black woman unintelligible to many of her listeners. See Crenshaw, Whose Story ls 
It Anyway?, supra note 25, at 402-04. I thank Anna Marie Smith for helping me to under-
stand Crenshaw's argument in this light. 
195. In particular, it would revise the second conception - discrimination applies to a 
group as a whole - and the fourth - discrimination represents a workplace-specific barrier, 
rather than part of larger system of discrimination that helps construct the subject - of the 
assumptions that have made it difficult for courts to address the claims of intersectional 
subjects. 
196. A conceptual shift that made discrimination affecting subgroups less exceptional and 
more paradigmatic of the kind of injury at which Title VII is aimed might be particularly 
important in hiring, firing, and promotion cases framed under a disparate impact theory. In 
these cases, the "business necessity" defense _invites courts to engage in more of a balancing 
analysis than is frequently the case in disparate treatment litigation, when defendants' pri-
mary recourse is to the fairly narrow "bona fide occupational qualification" exception. A 
conceptual account that, in contrast to the current sex-plus doctrine, explained why such 
narrowly targeted discrimination was neither unusual nor less serious but in fact paradig-
matic of gender or race discrimination would permit complex claimants to fare better when 
their injuries came to be balanced against employers' necessity claims. 
197. A qualitative understanding of intersectional discrimination might be of assistance, 
for example, to complex - that is, intersectional - claimants in hostile environment sexual 
harassment cases. Particularly after the Court's rejection of a "serious psychological harm" 
requirement in favor of a "totality of the circumstances" test in Harris v. Forklift Systems, 
Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 {1993), plaintiffs must clear an amorphous but de minimus test in estab-
lishing that they have been harmed. A qualitative account of intersectional discrimination 
gives complex claimants - those who are specifically targeted or who have a disparate re-
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The stereotype of the promiscuous black woman is a vehicle for 
race discrimination, in that it racializes its sexual subject by refer-
ence to a dehumanizing image; and it is a vehicle for gender dis-
crimination, in that it ascribes a form of stigmatized sexuality to the 
female portion of a particular race. But it is also a terrain on which 
race and gender discrimination come together to reinforce and, by 
particularizing, reshape each other. 
b. Protected categories and characteristics. A social construc-
tivist emphasis also underlies the second change that would be nec-
essary to incorporate the complex subject in Title VII law: a change 
in the understanding of the characteristics that statutory categories 
protect. The assumption implicit in the Title VII regime is that 
membership in protected categories is biologically conferred and 
therefore unambiguous and stable over time. Legal actors must 
come to understand that biologically based qualities acquire their 
meaning through a process of social construction - through the 
practices and self-understandings of group members, the corrosive 
images of systems of discrimination, and a range of other influences 
- and the complexities of this process create far more variation 
and ambiguity than current doctrine assumes. 
Understanding characteristics such as gender or race as given 
meaning largely through social interaction has several implications. 
First, membership in a protected category arises, not simply 
through possession of a biological trait, but also through manifesta-
tion of social practices or qualities that have come to be associated 
with it.198 As a result, there is more ambiguity as to who belongs in 
particular categories, because there are more indices of what consti-
tutes group membership or identity and more ways in which these 
social and biological indices can intersect with each other. Second, 
discrimination can be quite various in the kinds of attributes that it 
targets: while some forms of discrimination follow the biological 
trait, others are tied to its social manifestations, and still others 
sponse to a general practice, such as the display of particular kinds of pornography in the 
workplace - a particularly illuminating means of explaining how and why they have been 
harmed. 
198. It might, quite reasonably, be argued that the language of the statute, including the 
use of terms such as sex and race, as well as salient portions of the legislative history, evince 
an intent to protect biological characteristics rather than those produced by social construc-
tion. I would note, however, that Title VII decisions on sexual harassment and the discrimi· 
natory operation of stereotypes, see infra section III.B.2, have acknowledged the difficulty of 
separating biologically given characteristics from socially constructed qualities that overlay 
them, as well as the need to address cases involving both. My approach would simply extend 
this insight from these areas into the mainstream of Title VII law. It does not depart so far 
from statutory language or original understandings as to endorse a pure theory of the social 
construction of gender or race. 
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track the intersection of the biological with- the social. Women are 
sometimes stigmatized on the basis of their sex - that is, simply 
because they are not men - but they may also be stigmatized for 
manifesting characteristics that are socially female.199 Men may 
also be stigmatized if they combine biological masculinity with so-
cially female characteristics, such as emotionalism or sensitivity to 
sexual conduct.200 Women, on the other hand, may be less severely 
stigmatized if they manifest socially male characteristics, such as an 
exclusive career focus in the workplace. But biological "outsiders" 
are not always assured of protection by assuming the characteristics 
of the socially dominant group. The interest of many social groups 
in preserving the meanings made intelligible by social practices, and 
the interest of dominant groups in preserving the power conferred 
on them by the comparative valuation of such practices, means that 
sanctions may be imposed on biological group members who at-
tempt to escape from the social characteristics ascribed to their 
groups.201 These factors mean that who may be considered a 
woman or a black for purposes of Title VII scrutiny is a mul-
tifaceted question, capable of contextually variable answers.202 
The understandings elaborated above would permit courts to re-
spond more fully to categorically ambivalent claimants.203 First, 
they would make clear that categorical ambivalence, such as that 
199. Christine Littleton refers to the first as "sex discrimination" and the second as "sex-
ual subordination." See Littleton, supra note 185, at 1045-46. 
200. Littleton refers to this phenomenon, which may target either men or women who 
break free of the social-role expectations associated with their biological sex, as "gender op-
pression." Id. at 1045; see also Chamallas, supra note 127, at 126-29 (discussing the sexual 
harassment of Goluszek). 
201. For an incisive, nuanced discussion of "disciplinary" harassment - violence or dis-
crimination aimed at punishing the transgression of socially specified gender roles - see 
DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING ETC. 147-62 (1993). For discussions of homophobia as a 
means of disciplining departures from social expectations associated with gender, see Fajer, 
supra note 86, and Law, supra note 86. 
202. This kind of variable understanding of the meaning of statutory categories might be 
viewed as an implementation of Angela Harris's injunction to make the multiplicity of iden-
tity visible by employing categories that are "explicitly tentative, relational and unstable." 
Harris, supra note 18, at 586. 
For a wonderfully nuanced view of the possible interactions between biology and social 
context, or in the author's terms "essentialism" and "constructivism," in creating the category 
homosexual, see Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of 
the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REv. 503, 556-68 (1994). 
203. These understandings would address the first (the biological character of protected 
traits makes group membership fixed and unambiguous), third (actions or judgments 
paradigmatically understood as discrimination are not applied to members of the same 
group), and fourth (discrimination as a workplace-specific barrier rather than as part of a 
larger system of discrimination that helps to construct the subject) of the assumptions that 
have complicated the resolution of cases involving categorically ambivalent claimants. 
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described by Scales-Trent,204 is not an anomaly but a form of sub-
jectivity that occurs all the time. Because they possess biological 
and social characteristics that admit of ambivalence within them-
selves and in combination, it is not unusual for people to manifest, 
in juxtaposition or combination, qualities assigned to different sides 
of a race or gender dichotomy. Nor, moreover, is it unusual to see 
discrimination aimed at different bases of a raced or gendered iden-
tity. A brief perusal of any set of sexual harassment cases suggests 
that women are sometimes harassed in response to their biological 
sex,205 at other times harassed in response to their manifestation of 
socially female characteristics,206 and at still other times targeted 
for their divergence from socially female characteristics.207 Courts 
have rarely felt compelled to look into these distinctions, because 
the recurrent factor, biological sex, is taken - often incorrectly -
to explain all varieties of abuse. If they were to do so, they would 
see patterns of discrimination that would justify enforcement in 
cases like Goluszek. The illumination of such practices as stigma-
tizing the social practice - notwithstanding its separation from the 
biological characteristic - or disciplining departures from race or 
gender norms can help place discrimination against categorically 
ambivalent claimants within the wider discriminatory patterns that 
Title VII targets. 
204. In Scales-Trent's account itself, the ambivalence is not simply biological, in the form 
of a mixed-race heritage reflected in light skin, although that is the ambivalence that is imme-
diately apparent to observers. It is also social: for example, she feels equally drawn to both 
gospel and classical music, an ambivalence she ascribes to her upbringing. See Scales-Trent, 
Commonalities, supra note 26, at 308. 
205. Examples of this type of case frequently come from blue-collar work settings, where 
women who are recent entrants into a particular workplace are harassed without regard to 
their particular personal characteristics, as an expression of male workers' belief that women 
should not be doing this kind of work. See, e.g., Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010 (8th 
Cir. 1988) (considering the physical harassment of women on a road crew and their co-work-
ers' characterization of them as "fucking flag girls"). 
206. These cases are harder to identify, as such women do not necessarily stand out in 
their work environment as it is depicted in the court's rendition of the facts. There are cases, 
however, in which a specific woman is targeted in the workplace and that woman appears to 
be particularly sensitive to sexualized conduct in the workplace. See, e.g., Bennett v. Corroon 
& Black Corp., 845 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1988) (addressing the claim of a woman who was 
obscenely depicted on the walls of a men's room at her place of employment and who was 
particularly sensitive to sexualized conduct in the workplace), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1070 
(1989). Although it is possible that harassers could be targeting such a woman with a genera-
lized desire to irritate the sensitive, quite apart from gender-role expectations, it seems more 
likely that this stigmatization of a kind of sensitivity frequently associated with gender is a 
devaluative response to a gendered characteristic. 
207. See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cerl denied, 481 U.S. 
1041 (1987); Ukarish v. Magnesium Elektron, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1315 (D.N.J. 
1983). 
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2. Statutory Strategies 
Title VII presents a unique kind of challenge to those who 
would implement the understandings elaborated above. Its en-
forcement has been strongly identified with a liberal, equality-based 
account of discrimination and determinate, biologically based con-
ceptions of statutory categories. Yet if an understanding of discrim-
ination as devaluation and a view of protected characteristics as 
socially as well as biologically derived has not developed within the 
dominant interpretation of the statute, it has not been wholly ab-
sent from Title VII doctrine. Cases concerned with sexual harass-
ment, stereotypes, and disparate impact claims reflect elements, or 
seeds, of these understandings. With proper interpretation, such 
caselaw might be used to introduce the more systematic changes 
that would permit courts to accommodate complex subjects. 
Sexual harassment cases, as well as cases involving the operation 
of stereotypes,208 reflect a promising point of departure, for several 
reasons. In these contexts, the elements of a Title VII claim that 
demand reinterpretation are writ large on the face of the case. The 
discriminatory judgments, disguised or oblique in many cases, are 
vividly rendered in.the language or conduct of the perpetrators; the 
constructive force of oppression and the way that gender reflects an 
amalgam of biological and social factors are highlighted by the in-
teractions of harassers and their targets. More importantly, these 
cases present one of the few contexts in which the background as-
sumptions necessary to accommodate complex subjects have begun 
to appear in doctrine. Sexual harassment doctrine, like disparate 
impact law,209 illuminates relationships between discrimination in-
208. Cases involving allegations of stereotyping in hiring, promotion, and firing decisions 
present a mixed picture in terms of their accommodation of complex claimants. Madeline 
Morris has argued persuasively that courts are able to recognize the operation of single 
gender-related stereotypes but fail to recognize or respond to the operation of multiple or 
intersectional stereotypes. Morris, supra note 44. Morris argues, for example, that the courts 
were able to recognize the expectation of femininity that hindered the plaintiff in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), as a form of gender discrimination, but they 
were unable to draw the same conclusion about the intersectional stereotyping - as an "old 
Jewish mother" type - that may have led to the termination of the plaintiff in Fertig v. B'nai 
B'rith Hillel Found., No. CJV-79-607E, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14291 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 
1987). See Morris, supra note 44, at 260-65. It is possible, however, to characterize Hopkins, 
not only as a case involving a singular stereotype, but as a case involving a categorically 
ambivalent claimant: a biological woman who lacked conventional femininity in dress and 
deportment. See supra note 121. Considered in the latter light, Hopkins sounds a more 
hopeful note for the prospects for legal accommodation of complex claimants. 
Although the current judicial approach in this area is mixed at best, I see cases involving 
stereotypes as fertile ground for the cultivation of alternate understandings of discrimination, 
for the reasons elaborated below. 
209. As I note supra in note 174 and accompanying text, disparate impact law reflects an 
effort to connect discrimination in the workplace to broader social patterns that may be use-
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side and outside the workplace. To the limited account of benign 
exacerbation of otherwise restricted opportunities offered by dispa-
rate impact law, sexual harassment doctrine adds scenarios in which 
perpetrators play more explicitly on socially created vulnerabilities 
or recreate within the workplace restrictive or oppressive gendered 
roles. Moreover, the analytic vehicle of the "reasonable woman," 
though no longer the applicable legal rule, reflects the receptivity of 
the doctrine to accounts of the social construction, through oppres-
sion and other influences, of the legal subject. In the stereotype 
cases, exemplified most recently by Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,210 
one sees the way that discrimination tracks social characteristics as 
well as, or in conjunction with, biological ones. In both contexts, 
one witnesses the ingeniously differentiated character of devalua-
tion - the way a similar judgment or urge can operate differently 
against different subsets of a group. 
The first part of the reinterpretive work to be done in these 
cases involves making explicit the elements of doctrine that depart 
from the dominant understanding. Cases should explain, for exam-
ple, that sexual harassment is actionable because it replicates, and 
relies upon for the efficacy of its subordination, forms of sexual 
domination and gender devaluation that pervade society outside 
the workplace. Some courts have taken a step in this direction, ex-
plaining that sexual harassment reflects the exploitation of the vul-
nerable position of the plaintiff's group211 or that it creates a 
different impression on women than on men because of their rela-
tive experiences of sexual coercion in the larger society.212 These 
explanations need to be sharpened, as they have been in the work 
fut in introducing a more constructivist understanding of discrimination. But because dispa-
rate impact cases may be cases involving no discriminatory or devaluative motivation - in 
which the prima facie case is made largely by reference to numerical showings - these cases 
may be less effective than sexual harassment or stereotyping cases for illuminating the new 
understandings of discrimination and group membership that will be most helpful in encour· 
aging judicial accommodation of complex claimants. 
210. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
211. See, e.g., Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N. D. Ill. 1988). Unfortunately, 
the Goluszek court failed to resolve the case according to this useful observation, because it 
assumed that the vulnerable group could only be biologically defined. 
212. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) ("For example, because 
women are disproportionately the victims of rape and sexual assault, women have a stronger 
incentive to be concerned with sexual behavior. Women who are victims of mild forms of 
sexual harassment may understandably worry whether a harasser's conduct is merely a prel-
ude to violent sexual assault." (footnote omitted)). Although the court's language - high· 
lighting incentives and understandable worries - evokes the autonomous liberal subject 
more strongly than the subject of social construction, the understanding that systematic op· 
pression shapes the state of mind of the victim is unmistakable. 
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of commentators,213 to highlight the explicit parallels between 
harassing treatment and the kinds of sexualized devaluation that 
women receive outside the workplace,214 and the effects that such 
treatment may produce on women's self-conception. Such an un-
derstanding locates employment discrimination as part of a larger 
system of discrimination that is potentially influential in the con-
struction of the subject. Judges should also note, to the extent that 
they can discern it from the context, when sexual harassment ap-
pears to target something beyond biological femaleness: for exam-
ple, a manifestation of socially female traits or a departure from 
specified gender roles. In Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 215 the 
court observed that the plaintiff, a particular target of the alleged 
harasser, was loud, assertive, and abrasive.216 It. might also have 
noted that the distance between these qualities and socially female 
role expectations made the plaintiff a more likely target for discipli-
nary abuse. Identifying such characteristics makes the varied basis 
of gender identity - and the varied targets of discriminatory ani-
mus - more apparent. Such efforts begin the revision of those as-
sumptions that impede response to complex claimants. 
The second part of the task lies in naming, with as much speci-
ficity as possible, the practices one finds in cases involving complex 
claimants. Just as sexual harassment cases once made clear that 
what was at one time viewed as horseplay or a part of the job de-
scription was, in fact, discrimination, these cases must now make 
clear that what look like partial attacks on a subgroup are, in fact, 
particularized expressions of a further-reaching gender animus.217 
213. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 123, at 18-23 (stating that many traditionally fe-
male jobs are defined so as to impose on women the same sexually inflected roles they oc-
cupy outside the workplace); GUTEK, supra note 3, at 15-16 (citing the phenomenon of "sex 
role spillover," which involves treatment of women according to roles through which they are 
perceived outside the workplace, sometimes including elements of sexual construction or sex-
ual devaluation). 
214. There may be some tension between emphasizing the connections between work-
place and societal discrimination, on the one hand, and, on the other, arguing for the inclu-
sion within Title VII doctrine of plaintiffs like Goluszek, who, as men, are subject to a 
different social experience. In some sense, this tension may perform a useful regulatory func-
tion, because Title VII should be available to combat a kind of gender discrimination that 
operates far more frequently against women. In cases of men like Goluszek, however, it may 
be possible to argue - to a greater or lesser degree depending on the case - that a man 
who demonstrates a substantial constellation of socially female characteristics is likely to 
have been subjected to varied forms of social discrimination outside the workplace. 
215. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987). 
216. 805 F.2d at 615. 
217. See, e.g., Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881F.2d412 (7th Cir. 1989), overruled in part by 
Saxton v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526 (1993); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 
1406 (10th Cir. 1987); Clay v. BPS Guard Servs., Inc. No. 92 C 2127, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
8399 (N.D. Ill., June 18, 1993). 
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Advocates must· argue, and judges must come to understand, that 
sexual derision, epithets, or threats are no less actionable or typical 
when they take a more particularized focus; on the contrary, the 
stigmatization of attractive women or blue-collar women or asser-
tive women or pregnant women is in many cases simply animus to-
ward women, expressing - and often camouflaging - itself by 
conforming to the characteristics of a particular target. This conclu-
sion becomes apparent when one surveys sexual harassment cases 
in the aggregate, but the insight must also be reflected in the resolu-
tion of the individual case. 
This strategy also requires that the compound forms of derision 
implicit in the harassment of women of color be identified and ex-
plained. Courts resolving such cases must specify that terms such as 
nigger bitch reflect both race and gender discrimination. They 
should be treated as additive in the sense that harassment of this 
type could give rise to recovery on either ground, thus foreclosing 
the kind of unidimensional resolution epitomized by Clay or 
Brooms.218 But they should also be recognized as interactive or in-
tersectional, in the sense that such terms would never be applied to 
white women or to black men; the aggregative understandings of 
cases such as Hicks should not be permitted to define the phenome-
non. Finally, this strategy means clarifying, whenever possible, that 
gender animus goes beyond associating biological traits with inborn 
incapacities. Such animus may also mean associating biological 
traits with certain socially prescribed roles and sanctioning depar-
ture from those roles through stigmatizing behavior. Courts and 
advocates should identify the derision - or in cases such as Hop-
kins, the application of stereotypes219 - that reflects this kind of 
218. Interpretation of the rule regarding the original EEOC charge in such cases should 
be liberalized so that charges regarding intersectional discrimination originally brought as 
either race or gender claims could be extended to include the other category when filed as 
Title VII suits. 
It is, of course, possible that in some cases there will be insufficient evidence of pervasive 
harassment as to one of the two categories of discrimination, although the plaintiff's claim 
may allege some epithets that should properly be regarded as both. The plaintiff's attorney 
in Brooms, for example, may have believed that this was the case - although, on the facts 
related, I would tend to disagree. Even when such an outcome is likely, however, it would be 
advantageous for courts and advocates to illuminate the intersectional character of any dero· 
gation that is specifically targeted at women of color; this will build the awareness that will 
permit such claimants to prevail on either ground in cases in which harassment was pervasive 
in both respects. 
219. Both the district court and Supreme Court opinions in Hopkins were quite explicit 
in identifying the operation of gender-role expectations and stereotypes in Price 
Waterhouse's decisionmaking process. See Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 
1117 (D.D.C. 1985) (highlighting advice to the plaintiff to "walk more femininely, talk more 
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry" as 
indicating a sex-role stereotype of a successful woman worker, and noting that female part· 
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disciplining behavior. Not only would such doctrine make recovery 
easier for women like Ann Hopkins and Vivienne Rabidue, whose 
behavior departed from socially specified gender expectations of 
passivity, charm, or deference; but it would also help courts to un-
derstand when less familiar forms of gender discrimination are in-
volved, as in the harassment of men like Goluszek and Polly. 
The standard hiring, firing, and promotion cases offer more am-
bivalent terrain for implementing change. Decisions in these areas, 
as we saw above, have sometimes vindicated the claims of complex 
claimants. Yet a failure in these cases to elaborate a theory of the 
discrimination that justifies recovery has made the emerging doc-
trine of cases such as Jefferies and Walker subject to arbitrary re-
striction. One difficulty may be that these are largely disparate 
treatment cases; they draw on a body of Title VII law that conforms 
most closely to the dominant understanding of discrimination, and 
they have been most insulated from conceptual innovations in the 
understanding of discrimination. As the understandings that permit 
the full accommodation of complex claimants are elaborated in ar-
eas such as sexual harassment, however, it may be possible to apply 
them so as to broaden and enrich the disparate treatment area as 
well. For example, a decision like Jefferies could be supported by an 
argument that confirms the centrality of the sex-plus doctrine, on 
the ground that the particularization and variability of gender-
based devaluation is one of the greatest sources of its durability and 
power. This understanding could make forms of discrimination that 
target a subgroup of a protected category a particular object of Title 
VII enforcement, unsubordinated to more general assaults on 
women as a group and not subject to the idiosyncratic restriction of 
cases like Judge v. Marsh. Cases such as Walker could be strength-
ened with highly particularized accounts of intragroup discrimina-
tion. As employment discrimination comes increasingly to be 
understood as exacerbating, exploiting, or replicating social pat-
terns of group-based oppression, it may become easier to explain 
the relation between race and color, or the ways in which inter-
group hierarchies may be reproduced within particular groups. In-
formed by such understandings - developed first in more 
hospitable bodies of Title VII doctrine - enforcement in same-
nership candidates at Price Waterhouse were viewed favorably if "partners believed they 
maintained their femininity while becoming effective professional managers"), modified, 825 
F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), revd., 485 U.S. 933 (1988); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
228, 256 (1986) ("It takes no special training to discern sex stereotyping in a description of an 
aggressive female employee as requiring 'a course at charm school.' "). 
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group cases will no longer appear anomalous or in tension with pri-
mary enforcement objectives under the statute.220 
* * * 
Encouraging judicial responsiveness to the complex claimant 
speaks first to the needs of those who have struggled from the mar-
gins of their respective groups. Yet it also promises to broaden 
dominant understandings of discrimination and to help a laudably 
flexible statute to confront more fully the patterns of oppression 
shaping life and work in this society. 
220. One might ask whether scarce energy and resources should be devoted to cultivating 
greater judicial solicitude toward male Title VII claimants, when Title VII enforcement has 
not yet succeeded in making many workplaces sufficiently hospitable toward women. As I 
suggested above, the framing of this question reflects a biological essentialism that I hope to 
call into question. A focus on the categorically ambivalent claimant - male or female -
will ultimately be of service to women by illuminating new understandings of discriminatory 
treatment and of what it means to be a member of the group women. Moreover, there is 
little in the highly contextualized emphasis on men reflecting socially female characteristics 
who have been victimized by more conventionally masculine supervisors or co·workers that 
will contribute to making the kind of red herring dreamed up by Michael Crichton paradig· 
matic. See MICHAEL CRICHTON, D1scLOSURE (1993) (depicting a female executive's harass-
ment of a male under her supervision). 
